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Article
Rejection, Revocation of Acceptance, and
Avoidance: A Comparative Assessment of UCC
and CISG Goods Oriented Remedies
Sarah Howard Jenkins*
Commercial parties purchase goods for use in their trade
or business or for resale. Their primary objective is to obtain
conforming goods of the desired quality at a price that
generates a profitable return on the resale or use of the
purchased goods. Occasionally, the seller delivers nonconforming goods, goods that fail to meet the contractual
obligation. This obligation may arise from the seller’s
description,1 statements,2 promises,3 practices,4 the course of
* Sarah Howard Jenkins is the Charles Baum Distinguished Professor of
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Bowen School of Law 2012), George R. Toombs (J.D. University of Arkansas–
Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law 2013); librarians Jessie Wallace
Burchfield (Professor of Law Librarianship; Circulation and Reference
Librarian at the William H. Bowen School of Law; B.A., 1989, University of
Arkansas–Little Rock; M.L.S., 1996, Texas Woman’s University; J.D., 2005,
University of Arkansas–Little Rock) and Melissa M. Serfass (Professor of Law
Librarianship; Electronic Resources / Reference Librarian at the William H.
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of Arkansas–Little Rock; M.A., 1991, University of South Florida) for their
assistance. The author extends special thanks to Dr. Karen Leonard, Chair of
the Department of Management, University of Arkansas–Little Rock, Dr. Joe
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Rock, and Kirina Alonzo with Air 7 Sea Transport Logistics, Inc.
1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods art. 35, Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CISG] (“The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and
description required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in
the manner required by the contract . . . .”); U.C.C. § 2–313(1) (2011) (“Express
warranties by the seller are created [by a]ny description of the goods which is
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the description.”).
2. U.C.C. § 2–313(1)(a) (2011) (“Express warranties by the seller are
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dealings and the course of performance5 between the parties, or
from trade usage or trade custom.6 The Uniform Commercial
Code (“Code”) and the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (“Convention”) empower the
buyer to thrust the non-conforming or defective goods back onto
the seller. Although the Code and the Convention contain
similar language regarding the buyer’s ability to return
defective goods, the buyer’s rights and the seller’s
corresponding duties vary in significant ways. An assessment
of these rights and duties is essential for crafting an agreement
that minimizes the adverse impact of the Convention on parties
who might otherwise be subject to it, while still reaping the
benefits available in the Convention but absent from the Code.
This article addresses the rights available to buyers pursuant
to the domestic sales law of Rejection,7 Revocation of
Acceptance,8 and the comparable right of Avoidance9 available
created [by a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.”).
3. Id.
4. CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any usage to
which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established
between themselves.”) (emphasis added).
5. U.C.C. § 1–201(3) (2011) (“‘Agreement,’ as distinguished from
‘contract’, means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language
or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course
of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in Section 1–303.”).
6. CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(2) (“The parties are considered, unless
otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its
formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known and
which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by,
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.”);
U.C.C. § 1–201(3) (2011).
7. U.C.C. § 2–601 (2011) (“[I]f the goods or the tender of delivery fail in
any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or (c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the
rest.”).
8. Id. § 2–608 (“The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or
commercial unit whose non–conformity substantially impairs its value to him
if he has accepted it (a) on the reasonable assumption that its non–conformity
would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or (b) without discovery
of such non–conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances. (2)
Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own
defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it. (3) A buyer
who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
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through the Convention. First, this article will assess the rights
granted to, and limitations imposed on, buyers by the Code.
Second, after establishing these rights and the conditions
precedent to the exercise of them, the rights and obligations of
the Convention will be assessed through a comparative lens.
Parallelism between the rights and obligations contained
in these two sources of law are obvious. Both permit the buyer
to return defective goods, but the conditions and standards
applicable for determining the right to do so vary. Both permit
defaulting sellers to cure or correct their failures in performing
if the goods are delivered in advance of the time for
performance or after the delivery date. However, the conditions
that authorize the exercise of the right to cure and the buyer’s
obligation to permit cure are distinguishable. For instance,
buyers in contracts that require delivery in separate lots, and
who are subject to the Code, will face different standards if the
buyer seeks to reject a defective installment rather than the
whole contract.10 Yet a similarly situated buyer subject to the
Convention will use the same standard for rejecting a defective
installment as it would for rejecting future installments.11
Contrary to the pronouncement by some United States courts,
the Code does not inform the interpretation and application of
the Convention.12 The Convention is an autonomous body of
principles that do not reflect in total any pre-existing legal
involved as if he had rejected them.”).
9. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49 (“The buyer may declare the contract
avoided: (a) If the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under
the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract;
or (b) In case of non–delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the
additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1)
of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. (2)
However, in cases where the seller has delivered the goods, the buyer loses the
right to declare the contract avoided unless he does so: (a) In respect of late
delivery, within a reasonable time after he has become aware that delivery
has been made; (b) In respect of any breach other than late delivery, within a
reasonable time: (i) After he knew or ought to have known of the breach; (ii)
After the expiration of any additional period of time fixed by the buyer in
accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47, or after the seller has declared
that he will not perform his obligations within such an additional period; or
(iii) After the expiration of any additional period of time indicated by the seller
in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 48, or if the buyer refuses to accept
performance by the seller in accordance with those articles, the buyer may not
reduce the price.”).
10. See U.C.C. § 2–612 (2011).
11. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 73.
12. Id. art. 7(1).
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regime.13
I. CONTEXTUAL DELINEATION OF THE RELATIVE
RIGHTS
A buyer who is confronted with a non-conforming tender or
delivery has several choices: keep the goods as delivered and
seek damages for the difference between the value of the goods
as warranted and the value of those delivered and accepted;14
permit the seller to repair or cure the delivery or the tendered
goods;15 reject the goods to push the goods back onto the seller
and seek substitute goods from third parties16 or the breaching
seller17 and damages;18 or seek damages even though substitute
goods are not acquired.19 Indeed, both the Code20 and the
Convention21 recognize a seller’s right to cure if the delineated
conditions are met and reflect a policy preference for
maintaining the contractual relationship and encouraging
adjustments between the parties to minimize damages and
needless costs.
A. A SELLER’S RIGHT TO CURE – THE CODE’S APPROACH
The Code permits the seller to cure if: 1) the time for the
seller’s performance has not expired or 2) the seller had reason
to believe that the tendered goods would be acceptable to the
13. See id.; see also Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in
International Uniform Law Via Autonomous Interpretation: Software
Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 303 (1996).
14. CISG, supra note 1, art. 50; U.C.C. § 2–714 (2011).
15. CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1); U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011).
16. CISG, supra note 1, art. 75; U.C.C. § 2–712 (2011).
17. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2).
18. Id. arts. 49, 74; U.C.C. §§ 2–601, 2–712 (2011).
19. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 49, 76; U.C.C. §§ 2–601, 2–713 (2011).
20. U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011) (“Where any tender or delivery by the seller is
rejected because non–conforming and the time for performance has not yet
expired, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and
may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery . . . [w]here the
buyer rejects a non–conforming tender which the seller had reasonable
grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance the
seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time
to substitute a conforming tender.”).
21. CISG, supra note 1, art. 48 (“Subject to article 49, the seller may, even
after the date for delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to perform
his obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without
causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of
reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. However, the
buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this Convention.”).
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buyer.22 Domestic law limits the opportunity to cure to sellers
who tender early, receive notice of rejection before the time for
performance of the contract has expired, and notify the buyer of
their intent to cure.23 This limitation facilitates the buyer’s
need to identify alternative sources of supply, minimize its risk
of non–performance of forward contractual obligations, and
permits needed adjustments to its production schedule, if any,
in conservation of its resources. The seller has the right to cure,
but the limited time frame reduces the number of sellers who
will likely qualify for this right.24 Performing in advance of the
obligated date of performance is contrary to Just-in-Time
(“JIT”) manufacturing and lean production, management
processes that eliminate waste, maximize efficiency, and
increase value for customers.25 The goal for the seller is
delivery “just in time,” neither early nor late.26 Early delivery
generates waste for the buyers by increasing costs for storage,
handling, and insurance. Delivering early also creates a course
of performance and, potentially, a course of dealings that, over
time, may result in an implied term of the contract obligating
the seller to perform in advance of the agreed upon delivery

22. U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011).
23. See, e.g., Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455 (M.D. Pa. 1972)
(finding that the seller’s offer to deliver 600 Scotch Pine trees to the buyer on
December 14, 1967 was a valid exercise of the seller’s right to cure because the
seller seasonably notified the buyer of its intent to do so, and due to an
extension of the delivery date, the time for performance had not yet expired).
But see Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Olympic Foundry Co., 565 P.2d 819 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1977) (relying on the repair warranty period rather than delivery
date to determine the amount of time the seller had to cure a defect).
24. See Telephone Interview with Dr. Karen Leonard, Chair of
Department of Management, University of Arkansas–Little Rock (Aug. 15,
2012) (“Early performance typically does not happen in the manufacturing
setting in large part because the manufacturer will have so much of its assets
tied up in pre–processed inventory such that early performance, even if it were
possible, would be a waste of time.”).
25. See Richard E. White et al., JIT Manufacturing: A Survey of
Implementations in Small and Large U.S. Manufacturers, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1
(1999) (observing that since 1980 U.S. manufacturers have accelerated the
rate of “just in time” implementation); Francis Quinn, The Lion of Lean: An
Interview with James Womack, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. REV., July 1, 2005, at
28; see also James P. Womack et al., LEAN THINKING (Simon & Schuster
(1996); JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD
153-162 (Rawson Associates et al. 1990).
26. See Telephone Interview with Dr. Joe T. Felan, Associate Professor of
Management, University of Arkansas–Little Rock (Aug. 30, 2012) (explaining
“just in time performance” as well as supply chain and production
management).
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date and hampering the seller’s production processes.27 The
second category of sellers who qualify for the right to cure are
those who are knowledgeable about the quality–range of goods
that are acceptable in the buyer’s business or industry, or who
have a course of dealings with the buyer, and who believe that
the goods tendered, which do not strictly conform to the
contract, will be acceptable to the buyer with or without a
money allowance.28 This latter category of sellers has been
interpreted to include those who are unaware of the nonconformity of the goods, if they reasonably believe that the
goods are conforming at the time of tender, but are later
notified that a breach occurred.29 This interpretation broadens
the right to cure a non-conforming delivery and allows a
defaulting seller to make conforming tender at “a further
reasonable time” rather than the contract date of
performance.30 Put another way, a seller that acts in good faith
and tenders goods it reasonably believes are acceptable to the
buyer will have additional time to cure the defect and avoid a
breach of contract. Such an interpretation facilitates the Code’s
policy goal of maintaining contractual relationships and
conforms, an otherwise rigid legal principle, to reasonable
commercial behavior.31 This interpretation of Section 2–508 of
the Code only excludes those sellers who knowingly tender
non–conforming goods without a reasonable belief that the
buyer would accept the goods with or without a money

27. See U.C.C. § 1–303(a), (b), (f) (2011).
28. See generally WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERIES § 2–508:3 (Linda J. Rusch updating, Frederick H. Miller ed., 2012)
(WL, Hawkland’s Uniform Commercial Code Series) [hereinafter HAWKLAND]
(“[O]rdinarily the parties to a commercial transaction are willing to depart
somewhat from strict compliance with the sales contract, frequently handling
any discrepancies in performance by money allowances or cure.”).
29. See T.W. Oil v. Consol. Edison Co., 443 N.E.2d 932 (N.Y. 1982); Bartus
v. Riccardi, 55 Misc.2d 3 (Utica City Ct. 1967); see generally William H.
Lawrence, Appropriate Standards for a Buyer's Refusal to Keep Goods
Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1670–71 (1994) (“The right
to cure protects the seller against ‘surprise’ rejections, and the ‘reasonable
grounds’ limitation protects the buyer from improper allegations of surprise.”).
30. U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011).
31. See T.W. Oil, 443 N.E.2d at 939 (quoting James J. White & Robert R.
Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §8–4, at 322–324 (2d. ed. 1980))
(“[T]he code intended cure to be a ‘remedy which should be carefully cultivated
and developed by the courts’ because it ‘offers the possibility of conforming the
law to reasonable expectations and of thwarting the chiseler who seeks to
escape from a bad bargain.”).
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allowance.32 Despite the more expansive reading of Section 2–
508 of the Code, the right to cure granted by the Code does not
approximate the right to cure available to sellers via the
Convention. The Code grants the seller a right to cure and does
not permit the buyer to restrict the seller’s cure if the seller
gives seasonable notice of its intention to cure.33 Absent a
contract term to the contrary, under the Code, the buyer must
permit the seller to cure if the goods are rejected and the seller
satisfies the conditions precedent to the exercise of the right.34
Although recent authority suggests the seller must be afforded
an opportunity to cure the defective goods as a condition to
revocation of acceptance,35 neither the Code nor prevailing case
law recognize the seller’s right to cure after the buyer’s
revocation of acceptance of the goods.36 Here, the non–
conformity involves a substantial impairment of the value of
the goods to the buyer37 and the buyer’s acceptance was
32. See McKenzie v. Alla–Ohio Coals, Inc., 29 UCC Rep.Serv. 852 (1979)
(finding that the seller did not have reasonable grounds to believe its coal
would be acceptable to the buyer, and therefore, could not rely on U.C.C. § 2–
508 to remedy buyer’s rejection of the defective goods).
33. See U.C.C. § 2–508 (2011).
34. See Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. 1967) (holding that the
buyer could not rescind the contract when the buyer refused to allow the seller
to cure the defect); Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, 256 A.2d 522 (Conn.
Cir. Ct. 1968) (deciding that buyer’s failure to make an effective rejection of
non–conforming goods implicitly constituted acceptance thus limiting the
damages buyer could recover). But see Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 480 S.W.2d
133 (Ark. 1972) (upholding the lower court’s rescission of a contract for non–
conforming goods because determining what equates to effective revocation of
acceptance is a fact–sensitive process).
35. See Mercury Marine v. Clear River Const., 839 So.2d 508, 512 (Miss.
2003) (quoting Fitzner Pontiac–Buick–Cadillac v. Smith, 523 So.2d 324, 328
(Miss. 1988)) (“The law’s policy of minimization of economic waste strongly
supports recognition of a reasonable opportunity to cure. . . . [C]ure is not
excluded by Section 75–2–608.”) (emphasis added by quoting opinion).
36. U.C.C. § 2–608 (2011) (“The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot
or commercial unit whose non–conformity substantially impairs its value to
him if he has accepted it (a) on the reasonable assumption that its non–
conformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or (b) without
discovery of such non–conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced
either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's
assurances.”); see Bowen v. Foust, 925 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)
(recognizing that U.C.C. § 2–508 does not apply to revocation of acceptance);
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8–5 at
467 (4th ed. 1995).
37. See Inn Between, Inc. v. Remanco Metro, 662 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013
(Nassau Co. Dist. Ct. 1997) (stating that the non–conformities were so
substantial and required buyer to call for repair so many times that buyer
could revoke acceptance); Wilk Paving, Inc. v. Southworth–Milton, Inc., 649
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induced by a reasonable assumption that the non-conformity
would be cured, or by the difficulty of discovering the defect
before acceptance, or by the seller’s assurances.38
Consequently, the seller’s right to cure under the Code arises
when the buyer rejects the goods, but the Code imposes no duty
to cure.
1. Cure – The Convention
In contrast to the limited scope of the right to cure under
the Code, the Convention permits all sellers to cure any failure
at their own expense, including a fundamental breach or
material breach – a breach equivalent to a substantial
impairment of the value of the goods.39 A failure may be cured
A.2d 778, 781–82 (Vt. 1994) (holding that the right to cure “has limits,” and a
buyer can revoke acceptance after multiple malfunctions and failed attempts
at a repair).
38. See Gramling v. Baltz, 485 S.W.2d 183, (Ark. 1972) (holding that
buyer did not waive his revocation of acceptance remedy when he continued to
use his truck after seller’s assurances and attempts at repairs); Mercedes–
Benz of North America Inc. v. Norman Gershman’s Things to Wear, Inc., 596
A.2d 1358 (Del. 1991) (upholding the trial court’s finding that buyer’s delayed
revocation of acceptance was permissible because of seller’s repeated
assurances that the defect would be cured); Uganski v. Little Giant Crane &
Shovel, Inc., 192 N.W.2d 580, 589–90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (finding buyer’s
revocation of acceptance may not have been timely under normal
circumstances, but there is an exception for cases involving complex and
expensive machinery, such as the defective crane at issue); Funk v.
Montgomery AMC/JEEP/Renault, 586 N.E.2d 1113 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(finding that the seasonal nature of the vehicle’s defect hampered the buyer’s
ability to discover the defect and revoke acceptance).
39. CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1); see Cour d’Appel de Grenoble, Chambre
Commerciale [CA] [appeals court] Apr. 26, 1995, RG 93/4879 (Fr.), English
abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=109 (holding that the
buyer of a used warehouse was entitled to the repair of defects, to the extent
that the warehouse would conform to the buyers original purchase, but the
buyer was not entitled to a new warehouse); Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [OLG]
[provincial court of appeals] Jan. 31, 1997, 2 U 31/96 (Ger.), English abstract
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=223 (holding that low quality
goods do not constitute a fundamental breach when seller offers to deliver new
goods and such a delivery would not cause unreasonable inconvenience to the
buyer); Landgericht Regensburg [LG] [district courts] Sept. 24, 1998, 6 U
107/98 (Ger.), English abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/
case.cfm?id=507 (finding that buyer could not assert avoidance of the contract
because it did not specify the defect of the fabrics and deprived the seller of its
right to cure); Handelsgericht des Kantons Zürich [HG] [commercial court]
Feb. 10, 1999, HG 970238.1 (Switz.), English abstract available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=484 (holding that when a buyer refuses the
seller's offer to cure, and a later delivery date would not result in a material
breach, the buyer is no longer entitled to price reduction). But see United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Digest of case
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“even after the date for delivery,”40 if the seller can do so
without unreasonable delay41 and without causing the buyer
unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement.42
A solvent seller who provides a record43 or data message44
promising to indemnify the buyer for expenses incurred as a
result of the breach should remove any uncertainty that the
buyer may have regarding reimbursement.45 The buyer retains
the right to claim damages that resulted from the nonconforming tender, including its expenses.46 This right to cure
after the date of delivery is in addition to the right to cure if the
seller delivers early.47 The seller’s broad right to cure under the
law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 158
(2008) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Digest] (explaining that while a breach is
“rarely fundamental” if it can easily be repaired, a buyer’s right to avoidance
because of a fundamental breach is not subject to the seller’s right to cure).
40. CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1).
41. See, e.g., Amtsgericht München [AG] [petty district court] June 23,
1995, 271 C 18968/94 (Ger.), English abstract
available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=147 (finding that buyer was permitted to
recover damages when buyer had to remedy defect on its own in order to
prevent further economic injury to its customers from seller’s delay).
42. See Markus Müller–Chen, Article 48, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 733, 736–37 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010) (explaining that a buyer may incur costs for
arranging the return of the goods for repair or for having to suspend
production while the seller repairs defective goods); see also CISG, supra note
1, art. 37 (describing the seller’s right to cure if the seller delivered goods
before the delivery date); Ingeborg Schwenzer, Article 37, in COMMENTARY ON
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 601, 605
(Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3rd ed. 2010).
43. U.C.C. § 1–201(31) (2011) (‘“Record’ means information that is
inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.”).
44. United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications
in International Contracts art. 4(c), UN Doc. A/60/515. Nov. 23 2005
[hereinafter Electronic Communications Convention] (“Data message’ means
information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, magnetic, optical
or similar means, including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange,
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.”).
45. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1); Markus Müller–Chen, supra note
42, at 737 (explaining that a seller’s right to cure may be dependent on
providing security for costs or an assurance of its responsibility if the buyer
doubts the seller’s willingness or ability to reimburse the buyer).
46. See Cour d’Appel de Grenoble, Chambre Commerciale ([CA] [appeals
court] Apr. 26, 1995, RG 93/4879 (Fr.), English abstract available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=109.
47. CISG, supra note 1, art. 37 (“If the seller has delivered goods before
the date for delivery, he may, up to that date, deliver any missing part or
make up any deficiency in the quantity of the goods delivered, or deliver goods
in replacement of any non–conforming goods delivered or remedy any lack of
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Convention is subject to two limitations that may be exercised
by the buyer: 1) the buyer’s prior notice of avoidance—
cancellation of the contract—that only arises if the breach by
the seller is a fundamental one,48 or 2) the buyer’s notice of its
refusal to permit the seller to perform in response to the seller’s
prior notice of its intention to remedy its performance.49 The
Convention grants the seller broader rights to cure than the
Code and empowers the buyer to bar the seller from exercising
that right. Furthermore, unlike the Code, the Convention also
empowers the buyer with a right to demand a cure.50
A buyer may require the seller to repair the non–
conforming goods or to tender substitute goods,51 if the demand
is made at the same time the buyer gives its notice of the
nature of the non-conformity of the tendered goods or a
reasonable time thereafter.52 This right to require the delivery
of substitute goods, or the repair of defect, is unparalleled
under the Code as a default provision, and for the right to be
effective under the Code it must be extracted as part of the
bargain in fact between the parties.53 The right to require a
distant seller to repair or to deliver a substitute tender is a
valuable one for buyers who have a special need for custom or
scarce goods, whose production schedule requires an
uninterrupted flow of the goods, or whose contract right to
purchase is as a long term contract.
conformity in the goods delivered, provided that the exercise of this right does
not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense.
However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this
Convention.”).
48. See id. arts. 25, 49.
49. See id. art. 48(2), (3), (4); Case No. 7531 of 1994 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.),
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=139 (holding that buyer could
avoid the contract because of a fundamental breach and seller’s offer to
substitute goods after the breach required the buyer’s consent).
50. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(3) (“If the goods do not conform with the
contract, the buyer may require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by
repair, unless this is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances. A
request for repair must be made either in conjunction with notice given under
article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.”) (emphasis added).
51. See Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [provincial court of appeals] June
9, 1995, 11 U 191/94 (Ger.), English abstract available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=130 (holding that the seller had to bear the
costs of substitution or repair of non–conforming windows and the buyer had a
right to be reimbursed for the costs of installation expenses).
52. For a discussion on buyer’s duty of prompt inspection and notice of the
nature of the conformity of the tendered goods, see infra notes 172–181 and
accompanying text.
53. See U.C.C. § 1–201(3) (2011).
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The Convention imposes conditions and limitations on
buyer’s rights. First, the right to require the delivery of
substitute goods is only available if the non-conformity is a
fundamental breach.54 This condition protects the distant seller
from incurring shipping or transportation costs for insignificant
defects. Second, the right to require the seller to repair the
goods only arises if the demand is not unreasonable under the
circumstances. For example, the right to compel the seller to
repair the goods may be unavailable if the buyer is able to
correct the non-conformity.55 A buyer asserting either of these
remedial rights may receive one of two possible responses from
the defaulting seller: a concession by the seller to the demand
followed by performance of the request, or a denial of the seller
of the obligation to perform. In the latter case, the buyer
encounters the limitation imposed by Article 28 of the
Convention, regarding enforcement of a buyer’s right to compel
performance.56 Although Article 28 recognizes a party’s right to
require performance, it does not obligate a court to enforce the
right to substitute performance or the right to request repairs
unless a court would do so under domestic law. Therefore, the
buyer must determine if the right to compel the delivery of
substitute goods or to compel repairs is, indeed, recognized by
the court that it selects as the forum for enforcing its right.
Promulgation of the Code has liberalized the availability of
specific performance in U.S. courts; compelling the seller to
deliver substitute goods or to make repairs is growing in
recognition when appropriate circumstances arise, although it
is not a part of the U.S. domestic legal tradition.57 Additionally,
54. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court of Poland], May 11, 2007, V
CSK 456/06, English abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/
case.cfm?id=1374 (holding that buyer cannot demand substitute goods from
buyer unless there was a fundamental breach of the contract).
55. UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 39, at 153.
56. CISG, supra note 1, art. 28 (“If, in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention, one party is entitled to require performance of any obligation
by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific
performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of
similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention.”).
57. See Colorado–Ute Elec. Ass’n, v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152,
1159 (D. Colo. 1981) (holding specific performance is a proper remedy to
compel a seller to repair a unique item such as a precipitator that the buyer
purchased to measure state pollution standards); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of
U.S., Inc. v. State, 146 A.D.2d 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) aff'd, 550 N.E.2d 919
(N.Y. 1990) (rejecting automobile association’s position that state lemon laws
granting buyers a remedial right to a replacement vehicle violated its right to
trial by jury and finding that such a remedy allows for specific performance in
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Article 28 does not limit a court’s discretion to deviate from
domestic law in order to facilitate uniform interpretation of the
Convention, or to protect the expectations of foreign parties.58
The buyer who desires to have an enforceable right to compel
performance must consider including a choice of forum clause
in its agreement with the seller and should select a forum
whose domestic law authorizes specific performance. In
selecting a forum additional factors should be considered, such
as foreign procedural rules and the availability of discovery
tools. Alternatively, the parties might agree to arbitrate their
potential disputes and expressly agree that specific relief is
available.
The right to cure provisions of the Convention provide
greater parity between the parties than the Code. The seller
has expansive rights to correct its defective performance and to
reduce the damages the buyer may incur, the buyer is not
subject to the seller’s desire to cure, and the buyer is
empowered to demand a cure—a meaningful remedy—from the
seller. Allowing the buyer to demand a cure recognizes the
costs associated with seeking substitute goods in the open
market that could potentially be minimized by requiring the
seller to provide them, since the seller is already engaged in
producing or acquiring the exact goods the buyer seeks. Put
another way, if the breaching seller is required to supply
conforming goods—from its inventory, by immediate
manufacture, or acquisition from third parties—then the costs
associated with locating a substitute provider and negotiating a
substitute contract, the impact on the buyer’s business and
reputation caused by delay in obtaining substitute goods from a
third party, and the magnitude of the damages accumulated,
although recoverable, are reduced. “Substitute goods may be
difficult to locate . . . their price may be substantially above the
the appropriate contexts); Stoughton Trailers, LLC v. ArcelorMittal Dofasco,
Inc., 2008 WL 4722398 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 8, 2008) (declining to grant specific
performance as a remedy when the defective goods were not determined to be
“unique” and awarding damages was not inadequate); U.C.C. § 2–716(1)
(2011) (“Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in
other proper circumstances.”) (emphasis added).
58. See Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in
International Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the Vienna
Convention, 63 Wash. L. Rev. 607 (1988); see generally John Fitzgerald, CISG,
Specific Performance, and the Civil Law of Louisiana and Quebec, 16 J. L. &
COM. 291 (1997); Markus Müller–Chen, Article 28, in COMMENTARY ON THE
UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS supra note 42, at
459.
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contract price; or alternative manufacturers may not have
comparable reputations for quality;”59 or may fail to provide
desired warranties. Sellers also benefit from the buyer’s use of
Article 46(2) and (3). Sellers who perform “preserve good will
[with customers], reduce damage liability and avoid the drastic
remedy of avoidance of the contract.”60
The remedial rights of cure available through the
Convention give international commercial parties the flexibility
needed to meet the challenges that they face in rectifying
defective performance, despite the limitation imposed by
Article 28. Additionally, remedial rights of cure increase the
likelihood of resolving the seller’s failure without litigation. In
comparison to the Code, the Convention provides the better
remedy for non-conforming or defective goods.
B. BUYER’S OBLIGATION TOWARDS REJECTED GOODS –
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
Despite the existence of the right to cure or the right to
demand a cure, the non-conforming or defective goods may not
be curable. For example, even when the seller attempts to
repair or modify goods, the modified goods may not satisfy the
seller’s obligation under the contract terms. The quality of the
goods as repaired may impair the integrity of the buyer’s end
product, the repaired goods may fail to meet the buyer’s resale
obligation, or the attempted cure of rejected goods may be
unsuccessful. In any of these cases, both legal regimes, the
Code and the Convention, establish a standard of care for a
buyer who is in control or possession of the goods.61 The Code
requires a buyer who is pushing the goods back on the seller to
hold rejected goods in its possession, or within its control, with
reasonable care62 for the seller’s disposition but only for “a time
sufficient” for the seller to take custody of the goods.63 This
59. See Kastely, supra note 58, at 611.
60. JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 416 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed.
2009) (discussing the benefits granted to sellers who deliver substitute goods
or who repair non-conforming goods).
61. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 85–88; U.C.C. §§ 2–602, 2–604 (2011).
62. U.C.C. § 2–602(2)(b) (2011); see generally In re Empire Pacific
Industries, Inc., 71 B.R. 500 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987); Yates v. Clifford Motors,
Inc., 423 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super Ct. 1980) (stating that U.C.C. § 2–602 only
imposes a duty on the buyer to hold rejected goods for the seller and not a duty
to return them).
63. Graybar Elec. Co. v. Shook, 195 S.E.2d 514 (N.C. 1973) (holding that,
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duty to hold with reasonable care is subject to the buyer’s right
to sell the goods to satisfy a security interest granted to the
buyer under Article 2 of the Code for deposits or other
payments made for the goods or expenses incurred in
transporting, inspecting, caring for, or holding the goods for
seller.64 This right to sell the goods to satisfy the buyer’s outlay
for the goods protects the buyer from: 1) the risk of non–
reimbursement from an insolvent seller;65 2) the time and
expense of negotiating a reimbursement;66 and 3) the cost of
litigation to recover the buyer’s expenses or payments.
Section 2–603 of the Code imposes a special obligation on
merchant buyers ,67 buyers with specialized knowledge of the
although goods were ultimately stolen, buyer fulfilled duty to care for goods by
storing rejected items in a well–lit storage area for three months); Lykins Oil
Co. v. Fekkos, 507 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio C.P. 1986) (holding that seller was
responsible for loss of stolen tractor after permitting buyer to leave it on his
lawn until seller could retrieve it).
64. U.C.C. § 2–711(3) (2011) (“On rightful rejection or justifiable
revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his
possession or control for any payments made on their price and any expenses
reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and
custody and may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an
aggrieved seller.”); see, e.g., T & S Brass & Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pic–Air, Inc.,
790 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that buyer could keep nonconforming zinc handles because he had acquired a security interest in the
goods for the cost of inspecting them); Kleiderfabrik v. Peters Sportswear Co.,
483 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (buyer resold non-conforming jackets
to recover its handling costs, but it failed to provide the seller with notice of
the sale as required by §2–706 and destroyed records regarding the sale;
buyer’s actions did not constitute conversion but ambiguities would be
resolved against the buyer); Johnsrud v. Lind, 219 N.W.2d 181, 191 (N.D.
1974) (holing that buyer obtained a security interest in the delivered rejected
steers for the buyer’s partial payment plus any expenses reasonably incurred
to care for the steers); Askco Engineering Corp. v. Mobil Chemical Corp., 535
S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that buyer obtained a security
interest in rejected goods for the inspecting, testing, storing, and attempted
resale of the goods).
65. In re DeNicola, 92 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (concluding that
buyer lost the right to assert security interest in the rejected electric cart
when she surrendered possession of it to the seller); In re Adams Plywood,
Inc., 48 B.R. 719 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1985) (deciding that buyer should have
retained possession of the rejected goods to protect its right to assert a security
interest in the goods under U.C.C. §2–711).
66. See Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 657 P.2d 109 (N.M. 1982) (buyer
rejected and held defective pickup truck dump units for two years after seller
refuse to reimburse shipping costs incurred in taking delivery; the buyer’s
subsequent sale of the units was not an acceptance of the goods).
67. U.C.C. § 2–104 (2011) (“‘Merchant’ means a person who deals in goods
of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
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goods68 or who have knowledge of the specialized practices of
the relevant industry.69 The merchant buyer must follow any
reasonable instructions received from the seller regarding the
goods and, if none are received, make reasonable efforts to sell
the goods in its possession or within its control for the seller’s
account if the tendered goods are perishable or threaten to
decline speedily in value. Possession and control are “words of
wide, rather than narrow, import . . . [T]he measure of the
buyer’s ‘control’ is whether he can practicably effect control
without undue commercial burden.”70 The determining factor of
the buyer’s obligation is the extent of the burden on the buyer
in taking possession of the goods.71 Beyond these special
obligations imposed on merchant buyers and any contract
terms that impose additional duties, the buyer has no further
obligations to the rejected goods.72 The buyer is entitled to
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.”).
68. U.C.C. § 2–104 cmt. 2 (2011) (“The special provisions as to merchants
appear only in this Article and they are of three kinds . . . A third group of
sections includes 2–103(1)(b), which provides that in the case of a merchant
‘good faith’ includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade; 2–327(1) (c), 2–603 and 2–605, dealing with
responsibilities of merchant buyers to follow seller’s instructions, etc.; 2–509
on risk of loss, and 2–609 on adequate assurance of performance. This group of
sections applies to persons who are merchants under either the ‘practices’ or
the ‘goods’ aspect of the definition of merchant.”).
69. See K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1115 (6th
Cir. 1982) (holding that two sewer contractors were merchants because of
their knowledge of the sewage industry even though neither had specialized
knowledge of the goods); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant
Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in
Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141 (1985); R.J. Robertson, Jr., Rights and
Obligations of Buyers with Respect to Goods in Their Possession After Rightful
Rejection or Justifiable Revocation of Acceptance, 60 IND. L.J. 663, 675–676
(1985) (explaining that knowledge of specialized practices is the reasonable
understanding of who U.C.C. merchant provisions apply to).
70. U.C.C. § 2–603 cmt. 2 (2011). See e.g., Mitral Corp. v. Vermont Knives,
Inc., 566 A.2d 406 (Vt. 1989) (holding that buyer had duty to follow seller’s
reasonable instructions regarding care of rejected goods).
71. See U.C.C. § 2–603 cmt. 2 (2011).
72. U.C.C. § 2–602(2)(c) (2011); see also T & S Brass & Bronze Works, Inc.
v. Pic–Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that buyer’s
refusal to follow seller’s instructions to return defective handles did not
constitute acceptance because the seller refused to pay the expenses of
returning the goods, making its instructions unreasonable); Delano Growers'
Co–op. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 473 N.E.2d 1066, 1073 (Mass. 1985)
(holding that buyer fulfilled its obligation after following seller’s instructions
to process and resell the goods); Integrated Circuits Unlimited, Inc. v. E.F.
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acquire substitute goods and seek damages to compensate it for
the resulting loss even if substitute goods are not acquired.73
1. Buyer’s Obligation to Preserve Rejected Goods – The
Convention
Although similar to the obligations imposed by the Code,
those imposed by the Convention are not identical. If the buyer
receives the goods and intends to reject them pursuant to a
right provided in the Convention or a contractual right, the
buyer must take reasonable steps under the circumstances to
preserve the rejected goods.74 The Convention does not define
“rejection” but includes the right to refuse the goods after they
have been delivered. Under the Convention, the buyer has the
right to refuse seller’s goods after delivery if any one of the
following five situations occurs: 1) a fundamental breach by the
seller giving the buyer the right to avoid the contract;75 2) the
buyer requests the delivery of substitute goods because of the
seller’s fundamental breach;76 3) the seller delivers early and
the buyer refuses to take delivery;77 4) the seller delivers a
quantity in excess of that ordered and the buyer refuses the
delivery;78 and 5) the buyer exercises the right to suspend
performance after the seller dispatches the goods and the seller
fails to provide adequate assurances of its performance.79 Only
Johnson Co., 691 F. Supp. 630, 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), rev’d on other grounds,
875 F.2d 1040 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a buyer of microprocessors who
received no instructions from the seller, whose goods were neither perishable
nor subject to rapidly declining value, was not required to resell the goods);
Robertson, Jr., supra note 69, at 673–673 (discussing inconsistent holdings
regarding the effect of buyer’s conduct after rejection or revocation of
acceptance).
73. U.C.C. §§ 2–712, 2–713 (2011).
74. CISG, supra note 1, art. 86.
75. See HONNOLD, supra note 60, at 454–57 (explaining the circumstances
when a buyer can reject non–conforming parts of a delivery and when a buyer
can avoid the contract completely).
76. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2).
77. See id. art. 52(1); Klaus Bacher, Articles 85–88, in COMMENTARY ON
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 895, 903 (Peter
Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005).
78. Bacher, supra note 77, at 903; see CISG supra note 1, art. 52(2).
79. CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1); see, e.g., Oberlandesgericht Hamm
[OLG] [higher regional court] June 23, 1998, 19 U 127/97 (Ger.), English
abstract available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980623g1.html (“The
buyer was allowed to suspend performance of its obligations according to
article 71(1)(a) CISG. . . . [I]t had become apparent that the sellers would not
be able to perform the delivery of the furniture, which constituted a
substantial part of their obligations.”); Landgericht Berlin [LG] [regional
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in these circumstances will the buyer have received the goods
or will have had the goods placed at the buyer’s disposal. Some
commentators suggest that this duty to preserve the goods also
arises if the buyer exercises the right of avoidance when
authorized by Article 72.80 However, Article 72 recognizes a
right of avoidance when circumstances, prior to performance,
clearly indicate that one party will commit a fundamental
breach; this is the more analogous to anticipatory repudiation
in UCC § 2–610.81 Conceptually, the authors fail to recognize
the limited scope of the right of rejection. A right to reject may
be exercised only if the goods have been received or placed at
the buyer’s disposal at the contract destination.82 This is the
condition precedent to the duty to preserve. Article 72
empowers the buyer to resort to the remedial relief of avoiding
the contract because of conduct or statements by the seller that
occur prior to the date of performance.83 A buyer will not have
goods to reject when it exercises the right of avoidance prior to
delivery based on conduct or communications indicating that
the seller will not perform in the future. There is, however, one
exception: an installment contract.84 For example, assume that
a buyer and a seller have entered into an installment contract
with four planned deliveries. Each of the four deliveries is a
component of new machinery for the buyer’s new
manufacturing plant. The buyer receives deliveries one and
two, and then the seller disavows its obligation to meet certain
standards or the duty to complete performance. These
court] Sept. 15, 1994, 52 S 247/94 (Ger.), English abstract available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940915g1.html (holding that the buyer could
suspend contract performance under Art. 71(1)(b) CISG because the seller
failed to assure the buyer of performance after delivering defective items.).
80. CISG, supra note 1, art 72. See, e.g., FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH
MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 355 (1992).
81. CISG, supra note 1, art 72; U.C.C. § 2–610 (2011); ENDERLEIN &
MASKOW, supra note 80, at 291.
82. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
83. CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1); see, e.g., Magellan Int’l Corp. v.
Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 925–926 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (finding
that if the seller had indicated in a letter “its pre–performance intention not to
perform the contract” and had insisted upon an amendment to the bill of
lading, then buyer has standing for anticipatory fundamental breach of
contract.); Zürich Handelskammer [Zurich Chamber of Commerce] May 31,
1996,
ZHK
273/95
(Switz.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=396 (declaring an unwillingness to make
further deliveries constitutes a fundamental breach, the buyer was within
their rights to refuse to pay the bill and try to renegotiate the contract.).
84. The Convention refers to “instalment contracts.”
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statements trigger the buyer’s right to avoid deliveries three
and four pursuant to Article 72 and to avoid the earlier
deliveries, one and two, as provided in Article 73(3) because of
their interdependence.85 In this scenario the buyer has received
goods and may reject those goods already received along with
the future deliveries.
A buyer who receives the goods must take reasonable steps
under the circumstances to preserve the goods.86 If the seller
does not have a representative at the destination the same duty
to protect applies to the goods that have been “placed at [the
buyer’s] disposal”87 at the agreed destination88 but only if
possession of the goods can be obtained without paying the
price and without unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable
expense.89 Some argue that if possession can be obtained
85. CISG, supra note 1, art. 73(3) (“A buyer who declares the contract
avoided in respect of any delivery may, at the same time, declare it avoided in
respect of deliveries already made or of future deliveries if, by reason of their
interdependence, those deliveries could not be used for the purpose
contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract.”).
See, e.g., China Int’l Econ. & Trade Arb. Comm’n [CIETAC] Apr. 7, 2005, Shen
G2004100
(China),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050407c1.html (finding that upon taking
delivery of the goods and finding the goods defective, the buyer’s avoidance of
the contract for deliveries already made was acceptable under CISG art. 73);
Neth. Arb. Inst. [NAI] Oct. 15, 2002, 2319 (Neth.), English abstract available
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1.html (finding that the buyer
could suspend future deliveries under CISG Article 73(1), because the nonconformities found in the oil and the deliveries, which were in instalments,
were not interdependent.); Tribunal Cantonal de Vaud [appellate court] Apr.
11,
2002,
100/2002
(Switz.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020411s1.html (finding that under CISG art.
73, even if apparel items formed an “ensemble” with the defective pieces, the
buyer would still be able to sell those items separately, and therefore; would
not be required to return all the goods on the grounds of interdependency).
86. CISG, supra note 1, art. 86(1).
87. Id. art. 86(2).
88. See generally, Audiencia Provincial de Navarra [A.P.] [provincial
appellate court] Jan. 22, 2003, 3/2003 (Spain), English abstract available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=882; Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona
[A.P.] [provincial appellate court] Mar. 11, 2002, 60/2002 (Spain), English
abstract available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020311s4.html; Rizhao
Intermediate People’s Ct., Dec. 17, 1998, Ri Jingchuzi No.29 (China), English
abstract available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991217c1.html; Trib. of
Int’l Commercial Arb. at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce, Sept.
25,
1995,
142/94
(Russ.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=251.
89. See, Secretariat Commentary on Article 75 of the 1978 Draft, GUIDE TO
CISG
ARTICLE
86,
available
at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm–86.html.
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without unreasonable expense, then the rationale used in
Article 86, which places the duty to protect on the party in the
best position to protect and care for the goods, justifies the
application of the duty to protect even if the goods are delivered
to a destination other than that specified in the agreement.90
The term “placed at his disposal” is used in Articles 69 and
86 of the Convention, but the term is not defined.91 Commercial
parties in international trade are accustomed to this usage
because of the term’s significance in the shipping and
delivering of goods. The phrase, “placed at his disposal,” is used
in a number of the Incoterms, customary shipping terms
promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce,92 and
it is employed by parties in international sales agreements to
identify the point at which the seller has completed its
performance obligation in delivering the goods.93 “EXW”
(named place of delivery)94 and “DAP” (named place of
destination)95 are two examples. The seller completes its
90. See Bacher, supra note 77, at 904 (arguing that if the buyer can take
possession of the goods without any problems, Article 86(2) may be applied by
analogy to goods dispatched to a place other than their contractually agreed
destination).
91. CISG, supra note 1, art. 69 (“(1) In cases not within articles 67 and 68,
the risk passes to the buyer when he takes over the goods or, if he does not do
so in due time, from the time when the goods are placed at his disposal and he
commits a breach of contract by failing to take delivery. (2) However, if the
buyer is bound to take over the goods at a place other than a place of business
of the seller, the risk passes when deliver is due and the buyer is aware of the
fact that the goods are placed at his disposal at that place. (3) If the contract
relates to goods not then identified, the goods are considered not to be placed
at the disposal of the buyer until they are clearly identified to the contract.”)
(emphasis added); CISG, supra note 1, art. 86(2) (“If goods dispatched to the
buyer have been placed at his disposal at their destination and he exercises
the right to reject them, he must take possession of them on behalf of the
seller, provided that this can be done without payment of the price and
without unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense.”) (emphasis
added).
92. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2010, 16, 54, 62, 70
(2010) for Incoterms that use the phrase “placing them at the disposal of the
buyer.”
93. See generally id. at 5–11 for rules on the use of domestic and
international trade terms.
94. See id. ¶ A4, at 16 (“The seller must deliver the goods by placing them
at the disposal of the buyer at the agreed point, if any, at the named place of
delivery, not loaded on any collecting vehicle.”).
95. See id. at 61 (“[T]he seller delivers when the goods are placed at the
disposal of the buyer on the arriving means of transport ready for unloading at
the named place of destination. The seller bears all risks involved in bringing
the goods to the named place.”).
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performance obligation to deliver the goods EXW (1464
Washington St., Phoenix, Arizona [seller’s place of business])
when the goods are placed at the agreed point, seller’s place of
business, for the buyer96 and buyer has been given notice.97
Similarly, DAP (named place of destination) imposes on the
seller the duty to provide the contract goods on the arriving
means of transport ready for unloading at the named place of
destination.98 Notice must also be given so that the buyer may
take delivery of the goods.99
In the Code the phrase “put and hold” is the delineation of
the seller’s duty of tender of delivery.100 It is analogous to the
term “placed at his disposal” used in the Convention. “[T]he
seller [must] put and hold conforming goods at the buyer’s
disposition and give the buyer any notification reasonably
necessary to enable him to take delivery.”101 When the seller
has completed its obligation of performance, at the agreed
place, in the manner required by the agreed to shipping terms,
and provided the buyer with notice, then the goods are “placed
at [the buyer’s] disposition.”102
a. Preserving the Goods: The Rights and Obligations
These rights and obligations can be best illustrated through a
hypothetical example. Assume that a Georgian winery agrees
to sell one hundred cases of its finest wine “FAS (free alongside
ship) Port Said (Incoterms)”103 to a U.S. importer. Under this
shipping term, the goods are delivered when placed alongside
96. Id. para. A4, at 16.
97. Id. para. A7, at 18.
98. Id. para. A4, at 62.
99. Id. para. A7, at 64.
100. U.C.C. § 2–503 (2011). (“Tender of delivery requires that the seller put
and hold conforming goods at the buyer’s disposition and give the buyer any
notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery. The manner,
time and place for tender are determined by the agreement and this Article,
and in particular (a) tender must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of goods
they must be kept available for the period reasonably necessary to enable the
buyer to take possession but (b) unless otherwise agreed the buyer must
furnish facilities reasonably suited to the receipt of the goods.”) (emphasis
added).
101. Id. § 2–503(1) (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 92, at 79 (“[Delivering
occurs] when the goods are placed alongside the vessel . . . The risk of loss of or
damage to the goods passes when the goods are alongside the ship, and the
buyer bears all costs from that moment onwards.”).
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the ship designated by the buyer at Port Said in Egypt.104
Assume further that the winery does not have an office, agent,
or representative of its interest in Egypt. However, the buyer
engaged a third party to inspect the goods before they
commenced the final leg of their journey to the U.S. Based on
the condition and temperature of the bottles the inspector
concludes that a fundamental breach has occurred, and he
advises the importer to reject the shipment. Because the goods
arrived, were placed at the buyer’s disposal at the contract
destination, and the buyer rejected them, the buyer must take
possession only if the buyer can accomplish possession without
paying for the goods or without unreasonable inconvenience or
unreasonable expense.105 “FAS” does not impose a payment
obligation, unlike the shipping term “CIF (Incoterms),” that
imposes an obligation on the buyer to pay for the goods upon
presentment of the contractually required documents before the
arrival and inspection of the goods.106 No duty to take
possession or to preserve the goods arises from a “CIF Port Said
(Incoterms)” shipping term, because the shipping term requires
payment for the goods before possession can be acquired.107
With the FAS shipment term, if the goods have been placed at
the buyer’s disposal, the U.S. importer must take possession of
the goods and preserve them consistent with the obligations
imposed by Article 86(2).108
In this example the U.S. importer may store the wine at
the seller’s expense with a third party,109 or retain the wine
until it is reimbursed its reasonable expenses for preserving
104. For additional obligations imposed upon the seller under FAS, see Id.
¶ A2, at 80, ¶ A7, at 82.
105. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 86.
106. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 92, at 105 (“Cost Insurance
and Freight.”).
107. See Secretariat Commentary on Article 75 of the 1978 Draft, supra
note 89; see also INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 92, ¶ A8, at 114
(“The seller must, at its own expense provide the buyer without delay the
usual transport document for the agreed port of destination.”); Id. ¶ B8, at 115
(“The buyer must accept the transport document provided as envisaged in A8
if it is in conformity with the contract.”).
108. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 86(2).
109. See id. art. 87; see, e.g., Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, supra note
88 (recognizing that CISG art. 87 permits a party with the duty to preserve
the goods to deposit the goods at the other party’s expense as long as the cost
is not unreasonable); Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 1994 WL 495787
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1994) (finding the buyer is entitled to recover costs of
handling and storing non-conforming compressors) aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995).
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the wine.110 Observe that unlike the buyer subject to the Code
who is permitted to sell the goods to recover on its security
interest in the goods to the extent of its expenses and
payments, the buyer subject to the Convention may only retain
the goods as security for its expenses. Although, Article 86(2)
creates an exception to the duty to preserve the goods if doing
so involves an unreasonable expense,111 Article 88 mandates
the sale of goods that rapidly deteriorate or if their
preservation “involves unreasonable expense.”112 Our importer
must determine if the condition of the goods will rapidly
deteriorate, especially given their condition at delivery, and, if
so, resell to eliminate the likelihood of being allocated the loss
resulting from their continuing deterioration. Consequently,
the importer who is excused from preserving the goods if doing
so involves unreasonable expense will have a duty to sell the
goods if they are perishable and subject to rapid deterioration.
Unlike the Code, the Convention does not extend this duty to
avoid loss in value of the goods because of shifts in the
market.113
This obligation was a rude awakening for a buyer who
purchased shrimp from a breaching Chinese seller. The buyer’s
end–user in Mexico took delivery of non-conforming shrimp
from a Chinese seller.114 The buyer retained the nonconforming shrimp in storage pending the resolution of the
dispute with the seller, without reselling the perishable goods
and as a result the buyer sustained a tremendous loss.115 The
tribunal found that the buyer permitted the losses to grow until
110. CISG, supra note 1, art. 85.
111. See id. art. 86(2).
112. See id. art. 88.
113. U.C.C. § 2–603(1) (“Subject to any security interest in the buyer
(subsection (3) of Section 2–711), when the seller has no agent or place of
business at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty after
rejection of goods in his possession or control to follow any reasonable
instruction received from the seller with respect to the goods and in the
absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell them for the
seller’s account if they are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily.”)
(emphasis added).
114. Rizhao Intermediate People’s Ct., Dec. 17, 1998, Ri Jingchuzi No.29
(China),
English
abstract
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991217c1.html (holding that because the
buyer did not take reasonable measures to preserve the shrimp pending
litigation, permitting losses to grow, the buyer was not entitled to a full
recovery from the sellers for the loss in value between delivery and resale by
customs.).
115. Id.
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the value of the shrimp was “nearly extinguished.”116 The court
determined that the sellers must repay the buyer $110,701.86
for the non-conforming shrimp ($103,562.86 price of the goods,
$1,052 DDC fee,117 $5,752 freight, $300 supervision of loading,
and $35 certification fee118) plus interest starting from May 3,
1996, the date the buyer’s demand for negotiations expired,119
until the actual date of repayment.120 This recovery was subject
to a set–off of 70% of the loss in value of the stored shrimp, or
$56,941.21, which reduced the buyer’s total recovery by
54.98%.121
2. The Seller’s Duty to Preserve the Goods – The
Convention
Other than the seller’s common law duty to mitigate its
damages that supplements the Code,122 the Article 85
116. Id.
117. “DDC” is the destination delivery charge that “covers crane lifts off the
vessel, drayage of the container within the terminal and gate fees at the
terminal operation.” AIR 7 SEAS TRANSPORT LOGISTICS, INC.,
http://www.air7seas.com/ddc.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
118. Interview with Kirina Alonzo, Sales Representative, Air 7 Seas
Transport Logistics, Inc., (suggesting that the $35 certification fee is likely to
have been a Shipper Export Declaration fee, a declaration that the value of the
shipment exceeded $2500).
119. Rizhao Intermediate People’s Ct., Ri Jingchuzi No.29 (China) (The
buyer delivered the notarized documents of the FDA’s shut out of the shrimp
on April 25, 1996, and gave the sellers seven days to negotiate. The court
calculated the commencement of interest date for the following day, May 3,
1996).
120. Id.
121. Id.;
cf.
China
Int’l
Arb.
Comm.
[CIETAC]
[PRC–Shenzhen], June 6, 1991, English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910606c1.html (imposing storage fees on the
buyer and denying the buyer’s claim for the vast majority of the purchase
price when a Mexican buyer of Cysteine Monohydrate failed to take
reasonable measures to preserve the good and disregarded the Chinese seller’s
instructions for returning the non-conforming goods, which subsequently
decompose, the seller was only required to compensate the buyer $3,000)
122. See K & D Distribs., Ltd. V. Aston Grp., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 761, 768
(N.D. Ohio 2005); Simeone v. First Bank Nat. Ass’n, 73 F.3d 184, 188–89 (8th
Cir. 1996) (“[A]n aggrieved party has a duty to mitigate damages.”); Schiavi
Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 724–25 (Me. 1983) (“The
common law duty to mitigate damages survives Maine’s enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code in 1963. While the U.C.C. does not explicitly
require the mitigation of damages, it does provide that ‘principles of law and
equity’ not displaced shall supplement the Code’s provisions. 11 M.R.S.A. § 1–
103 (1964). The duty to mitigate is also implicit in the Code’s broad
requirements of good faith, commercial reasonableness and fair dealing.”); see
also U.C.C. § 1–103 (2011).
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imposition of the seller’s duty to preserve the goods is without
direct parallel in the Code. Indeed, in this regard the structure
of the Code and its remedial preferences are the diametrical
opposite of the Convention. A seller, subject to the Code, who is
confronted with a buyer’s breach for goods identified to the
contract, is expected to resell the goods rather than to hold
them for the buyer. Although Section 2–709 imposes an
analogous duty of holding goods for the buyer, this duty only
arises if the seller seeks to sue for the price of the goods after
“the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a
reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that
such effort will be unavailing.”123 In contrast, the seller who is
subject to the Convention must hold the goods for the buyer
until the seller avoids, or cancels, the contract. The Code’s
remedial structure encourages the seller to act with immediacy
in considering other potential customers or uses for the goods.
The seller who is subject to the Convention may lack the
corresponding incentive to act as expeditiously. The Code’s
approach is less likely to result in waste by forcing undesired
goods on a reluctant buyer. However, a thorough assessment of
the Convention’s approach is warranted.
If taking delivery or making payment is a concurrent
condition of the seller’s obligation to deliver, and the buyer fails
to take delivery or to pay, the seller’s duty to preserve the goods
for the buyer is triggered. This obligation, with a right of
reimbursement, only arises if the seller has possession of the
goods or the seller is able to take control of them. The duty will
not arise for a seller who has surrendered the goods to a
carrier, putting the goods beyond the seller’s control. However,
releasing possession of goods to a carrier upon the delivery of a
nonnegotiable bill of lading does not place them beyond the
control of the seller.124 The Convention imposes this duty to
preserve on the seller despite the earlier shifting of the risk of
loss to the buyer. The party with the risk of loss is accountable
for the goods if the goods suffer casualty or are lost or
destroyed.125 The seller’s obligation of preservation parallels
that of the buyer and reflects the policy goal of placing the
responsibility for the goods on the party in the best position to

123. U.C.C. § 2–709(1)(b) (2011); see also id. § 2–709(2).
124. See, e.g., id. § 7–504(c), (d).
125. For an argument on how to allocate the risk of loss, see HONNOLD,
supra 60, at 508.
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protect and care for the goods so that loss is minimized.126
When the seller’s contractual obligation requires the seller to
place goods at the buyer’s disposal at the seller’s place of
business; or to deliver the goods to the buyer’s facility; or to use
the seller’s trucks for delivery, the shifting of the risk of loss is
governed by Article 69.127 The risk of loss shifts to the buyer
when the buyer takes possession or fails to take possession
when the goods are placed at its disposal. If the goods are lost
or destroyed the buyer remains obliged to pay the contract
price for the goods. The breaching buyer who fails to take
delivery has the risk of loss and the seller who has possession
or control over the goods has the duty to preserve them or to
sell them for the buyer’s account, if they are rapidly
deteriorating.128
In a transaction subject to the Code, the similarly situated
seller has an index of remedies that is triggered when the
buyer repudiates its duty of performance, wrongfully rejects
goods, wrongfully revokes its acceptance of the goods, or
otherwise breaches its obligation. This index includes the right
to resell the goods. However, the seller is not accountable to the
buyer for any profit made on the resale of the wrongfully
rejected goods,129 and the resale transaction may be used to
measure the seller’s damages, if it was conducted in good
faith.130 Resale is the seller’s sale for the seller’s benefit. This
126. Bacher, supra note 77, at 904; HONNOLD, supra note 60, at 677.
127. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 69 (“(1)In cases not with articles 67 and
68, the risk passes to the buyer when he takes over the goods or, if he does not
do so in due time, from the time when the goods are placed at his disposal and
he commits a breach of contract by failing to take delivery. (2) However, if the
buyer is bound to take over the goods at a place other than a place of business
of the seller, the risk passes when delivery is due and the buyer is aware of the
fact that the goods are placed at his disposal at that place.”).
128. See generally, Bacher, supra note 77, at 912.
129. U.C.C. § 2–706 cmt. 11 (2011) (“[T]he seller retains profit, if any,
without distinction based on whether or not he had a lien since this Article
divorces the question of passage of title to the buyer from the seller's right of
resale or the consequences of its exercise.”); see, e.g., Desbien v. Penokee
Farmers Union Co–op. Ass’n, 552 P.2d 917, 927 (Kan. 1976) (finding that the
buyers breach of contract allowed the buyers to retain profits gained from
selling their grain at market price, nearly double that of the original contract
price); Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900, 908–909 (N.D. 1975)
(finding a breach of contract when the buyer refused the grain, allowing the
seller to resell the grain at a higher price and retain the profits).
130. U.C.C. § 2–706(1) (2011); see, e.g., Eades Commodities, Co. v. Hoeper,
825 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (“[T]he seller who resells goods has
damages based upon the difference between the contract price and
the resale price.”) (emphasis in original); President Container, Inc. v. Patimco,
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distinction between the Convention’s obligation of preservation
and the Code’s resale remedy is rooted in the right of the seller,
whose contract is subject to the Convention, to require the
buyer to pay for and to take the goods.131 This right is an
absolute, remedial alternative that is available until the seller
exercises the right to avoid or cancel the contract.132 This right
to require payment for the goods is not conditioned upon
seller’s inability to resell the goods as required by Code section
2–709(b).133 Rather, the Code reflects a preference for the
seller’s resale of the goods as a seller’s preferred remedial tool
with compensation for incidental damages for transportation,
storage and insurance costs.134 After the buyer’s breach the
goods are in the seller’s hands. The seller is the party with the
better knowledge of the goods, their use, and the relevant
markets.135 This preference for a resale for the seller’s account
minimizes loss by forcing the sale or use of the goods on the
party best able to promote them. A seller whose contract is
subject to the Code may only require the buyer to take and pay
for the goods if their resale is unavailable after reasonable
effort 136 or circumstances, such as the custom nature of the
82 A.D.2d 879 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (holding that the seller’s failure to
establish market price was not fatal to their recovery under U.C.C. § 2–706);
see generally Roy Ryden Anderson, A Roadmap for Sellers’ Damage Remedies
Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Some Thought about Pleading and
Proving Special Damages, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 245, 255–60 (1988) (discussing the
complexities of the damage formulae provided for in U.C.C. § 2–706 and § 2–
708 when sellers resell the goods in “good faith” and in a “commercially
reasonable manner”).
131. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 62.
132. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 453 at 608.
133. Id.
134. U.C.C. § 2–710 (2011) (“Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller
include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions
incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods
after the buyer’s breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or
otherwise resulting from the breach.”).
135. See Anderson, supra note 130, at 253, for a critique of § 2–709 “risk of
loss” provisions, as well as the efficiency benefits associated with seller’s
disposition of the goods.
136. U.C.C. § 2–709(1)(b) (2011). Compare Data Documents Inc. v.
Pottawattamie Cnty., 604 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Iowa 2000) (“[P]laintiff's attempt
to sell its overstock did not constitute a reasonable effort.”), and In re
Narragansett Clothing Co., 138 B.R. 354, 365 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992) (finding
that a seller who only made minimal efforts to contact other buyers, failed to
make reasonable efforts to resell), with W.I. Snyder Corp. v. Caracciolo, 541
A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“There was sufficient evidence from which
the jury could conclude that Appellee was unable to resell the goods at a
reasonable price after making a reasonable effort to do so.”). See generally
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goods, indicate that the efforts in reselling the goods would be
unsuccessful.137 The seller subject to the Code has an incentive
to move the goods as quickly as possible. As a result, buyers are
more likely to prefer the Code’s remedial scheme and sellers
are more likely to be drawn to the Convention. A seller
operating at capacity will prefer to sell goods from its inventory
to other parties, minimize its proof obligation to establish
damages, and require the defaulting buyer to perform.
II. GOODS ORIENTED REMEDIES OF THE CODE – ONE
LOT DELIVERIES, NON-INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS
In a contract that requires the delivery of the goods in one
lot but the circumstances necessitate the delivery in
installments,138 the seller has a duty to deliver goods that
conform to the contract for sale.139 This is commonly known as
the perfect tender rule.140 The goods must conform to the terms
of the contract for sale which includes terms implied from
course of dealings, trade usage, or course of performance.141
Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer has a right to inspect the
goods upon identification, tender, or delivery before it pays for
or accepts the goods.142 If the goods or the tender of delivery
fails in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may
reject the whole, accept the whole, or accept any commercial
Anderson, supra note 130, at 253 (“The problem cases under section 2–709 are
those in which the seller seeks the price action solely on the basis that he
cannot readily resell the goods at a reasonable price . . . The theory aims to
avoid economic waste by preventing a seller who is in the business of selling
the goods, and who thus can more readily and efficiently dispose of them, from
forcing the goods on a buyer who has no use for them.”).
137. U.C.C. § 2–709(1)(b) (2011); see, e.g., Emanuel Law Outlines, Inc. v.
Multi–State Legal Studies, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1081, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(finding that there was no realistic possibility of selling the outlines so the
buyer, Multi–State, is responsible for damages); Plateq Corp. of North Haven
v. Machlett Labs., Inc., 456 A.2d 786, 791(Conn. 1983).
138. U.C.C. § 2–307 (2011) (“Unless otherwise agreed all goods called for by
a contract for sale must be tendered in a single delivery and payment is due
only on such tender but where the circumstances give either party the right to
make or demand delivery in lots the price if it can be apportioned may be
demanded for each lot.”).
139. Id. § 2–607 (“Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in
installment contracts (Section 2–612) and unless otherwise agreed under the
sections on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2–718 and 2–719), if
the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the
contract . . . .”) (emphasis added).
140. Id. § 2–601; see also supra note 138 and accompanying text.
141. U.C.C. § 2–207 (2011).
142. Id. § 2–513.
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unit or units, if the price can be apportioned,143 and reject the
balance.144 The buyer’s rejection must be effective, within a
reasonable time after the delivery or the tender of the goods,
and the buyer must notify145 the seller within a reasonable time
of the buyer’s rejection of the goods.146 If the rejection is
ineffective or untimely, then the goods are accepted by the
buyer,147 and the buyer is liable for the price.148 The buyer’s
notice should particularize the defect that the buyer seeks to
rely upon to justify its rejection.149
If a defect is not particularized and it is one that was
ascertainable by reasonable inspection, the buyer, whether a
merchant or not, is precluded from relying on the unstated
defect to justify rejection or to establish breach if the seller
could have cured the defect.150 Likewise a merchant buyer may
not rely on a defect to justify its rejection of the goods if the
seller requests in a record a full and final written statement of
all defects on which the buyer proposes to rely.151 If an
unparticularized defect is the sole basis for rejection and it
could have been cured, the rejection is wrongful and the buyer
has breached its duty; the seller has the right to resort to a
remedy.152
A. CALCULATING “REASONABLE TIME AFTER TENDER OR
DELIVERY FOR REJECTION”
When making an effective rejection the first hurdle for the
buyer is to ensure that the goods are rejected within a
“reasonable time” after tender or delivery, in order to thrust the
goods back on the seller.153 Absent contract terms defining the
period for rejection or limiting the scope of inspection or
limiting buyer’s remedial right to reject, the determination of a
143. Id. § 2–601.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 1–202 (“A person ‘notifies’ or ‘gives’ notice or notification to
another person by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform
the other person in ordinary course, whether or not the other person actually
comes to know of it.”).
146. Id. § 2–602.
147. Id. § 2–606(1)(b).
148. Id. § 2–607(3).
149. See id. § 2–605.
150. Id. § 2–605(1)(a).
151. Id. § 2–605(1)(b).
152. Id. §§ 2–605, 2–703.
153. Id. § 2–602.
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“reasonable time after tender or delivery” is a factual one
dependent upon the circumstances such as the buyer’s
sophistication; the buyer’s knowledge of the goods; the
complexity of the goods; the nature of the defect, whether it
was patent or latent; the difficulty in discovering the defect; the
existence of express warranties regarding the quality of the
goods; the nature of the goods, were they perishable or durable;
and any course of performance between the parties after the
sale and before the buyer’s formal rejection.154 The course of
performance between the parties—such as complaints by the
buyer, negotiations between the parties, assurances by the
seller that the problem would be corrected, and the seller’s
attempted repairs—may enlarge the period constituting a
reasonable time.155 This treatment of the course of performance
between the parties reflects the general policy preference of the
Code to preserve the deal whenever possible.156 In most cases it
is too late to reject the goods if the buyer uses the goods and
has knowledge of a patent defect;157 processes the goods with or
without knowledge of a defect;158 uses the goods for an
unreasonable period of time without rejecting them;159 or
makes a substantial change to the goods.160
154. See supra notes 147–152 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Latham & Assocs., Inc. v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc.,
589 A.2d 337, 342 (Conn. 1991) (finding that the buyer reasonably delayed
rejecting the goods while the seller attempted to cure the known defects);
Yates v. Clifford Motors, Inc., 423 A.2d 1262, 1269 (Pa. 1980) (finding that the
buyer was not untimely in waiting between four and five months to reject a
truck because Yates was waiting for repairs to be completed by a Clifford
Motors repairman); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp.
325, 330–31 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (holding that buyer, who allowed seller eight
months to cure defects in a computer, did not fail to reject in a timely manner).
156. U.C.C. § 2 605 cmt. 2. (2011).
157. IMA North America, Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. 67 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d. 1073, 1094 (Ariz. 2009) (finding it too late for a rejection claim
since the buyer accepted and used the tablet machine for ten months knowing
that there were defects).
158. See, e.g., Borges v. Magic Valley Foods, Inc., 616 P.2d 273, 275–76
(Idaho 1980) (finding that the buyer knowingly processed the defective
potatoes consistent with the buyer’s ordinary course of business and therefore
has no grounds for rejection); A & G Const. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547
P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1976).
159. See, e.g., Barton Brands, Ltd. v. O’Brien & Gere Inc. of North America,
69 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1000, 1005 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff
accepted the baghouse and may not reject the baghouse regardless of defects
because the plaintiff used the baghouse for several months of daily operation
during which time the plaintiff had ample opportunity to inspect the goods
and reject them).
160. See, e.g., Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & Beck Div., Borg–Warner
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A buyer’s untimely rejection is ineffective and constitutes
an acceptance.161 The ease of forcing the goods back on the
seller that is afforded by the right of rejection is lost after
acceptance.162 Borges v. Magic Valley Foods, Inc., provides a
glimpse of the traps that lie in the path between rejection and
acceptance.163 Prior to the purchase, the buyer in Magic Valley
Foods examined potatoes that the seller had available for sale
and discovered a hollow heart defect in the potatoes.164 The
buyer and the seller agreed that if further inspection showed
that the defect was of a substantial nature and the potatoes
were unfit for buyer’s purposes, the contract would be null and
void.165 After delivery of the potatoes to the buyer’s plant for
processing, the state inspectors found substantial defects in
5000 of the 35000 hundredweight of potatoes.166 Here, rejection
after processing would have been timely because a contract
term permitted inspection during the stage of processing the
goods.167 Negotiations occurred between the parties; the seller
and buyer agreed on a cure.168 When the cure was unsuccessful,
the buyer flaked the potatoes and sold them at a loss.169 The
court correctly determined that the buyer’s act was an
acceptance of the defective goods because the buyer had an
obligation to give the seller notice of the failed cure and await
further instructions from the seller.170 Having previously
Corp., 578 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that the buyer may
not revoke acceptance of processed goods and was deemed to have accepted the
processed steel), aff’d, 762 F.2d. 1008 (6th Cir. 1985); Atlan Indus., Inc. v.
O.E.M., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 184, 189–91(W.D. Okla. 1983) (finding that the
buyer who received non-conforming reground plastic pellets could still reject
the goods because the non-conformity was not discovered until after the plastic
had been substantially changed but was restored to pellets by the buyer).
161. U.C.C. § 2–606(1)(b) (2011).
162. Intervale Steel Corp., 578 F. Supp. at 1087 (“A buyer’s acceptance of
the goods will most likely make the seller’s ability to cure the non-conformity
or resell the goods much more difficult.”).
163. Borges v. Magic Valley Foods, Inc., 616 P.2d. 273.
164. Id. at 274.
165. Id. at 274.
166. Id. at 274–75.
167. Id. at 275 (“It is . . . clear that the 4,838.77 c. w. t. of potatoes, unable
to make the fresh pack grade, did not conform to the contract and gave Magic
West the right of rejection.”).
168. Id. at 275.
169. Id. at 275.
170. Id. at 275–76 (“Generally, a buyer is deemed to have accepted
defective goods when, knowing the defect, he resells the goods without
notifying the seller.”); see, U.C.C. § 2–606(1)(c) (2011).
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rejected the goods, the buyer no longer had title to the
potatoes;171 title vested in the seller when the buyer rejected
the goods.172 The buyer had an obligation to give the seller
notice of the failed cure and to await the seller’s instructions.173
The goods, though perishable in nature, did not require the
buyer to immediately flake and sell them in order to prevent
loss; rather the buyer became obligated to pay the contract
price for the goods, by flaking and selling them rather than
notifying the seller that the cure had failed.174 This obligation
to pay was subject to the buyer’s counterclaim for breach of any
implied warranty or express warranty, but the burden of proof
on the issue of breach and the existence of any warranty lies
with the buyer.175 Rejection involves a simple call on the part of
the buyer, telling the seller to “come and get them!”176
B. THE CODE GRANTS A BUYER A SECOND RIGHT TO THRUST
THE GOODS BACK ON THE SELLER – REVOCATION OF
ACCEPTANCE.
Under the Code, the buyer may revoke its acceptance of a
lot or commercial unit whose non–conformity substantially
impairs its value to the buyer.177 Unlike the perfect tender rule,
which permits good faith rejection of some or all of the goods for
any insubstantial defect, revocation of acceptance requires a
substantial impairment based on the buyer’s subjective
assessment of its needs and goals under the contract. The
“substantial impairment” standard is analogous to the material
breach standard of the common law and Restatement (Second)
of the Law of Contracts.178 Therefore, the substantial
impairment standard falls between the perfect tender rule of
the Code for rejection and the fundamental breach standard
imposed for avoidance by the Convention.179 Revocation of
171. U.C.C. § 2–401(2), (4) (2011).
172. Id. § 2–401(4).
173. Id. §§ 2–603, to 2–604 (2011).
174. Id. §§ 2-606(1)(c), 2–607(1) (“The buyer must pay at the contract rate
for any goods accepted.”).
175. Id. § 2–607(4) (“The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach
with respect to the goods accepted.”).
176. Id. § 2–602(1) (the buyer may reject in a reasonable time by giving the
seller seasonable notification of the rejection).
177. Id. §2–608(1) (2011).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 242.
179. For a discussion of the fundamental breach standard see infra note
270 and accompanying text.
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acceptance is only available in two limited contexts: 1) the
buyer’s acceptance of the goods must be induced by a
reasonable assumption that a non–conformity of which the
buyer is aware will be cured but the cure has not been
seasonably provided;180 or 2) the buyer accepts the goods
without discovering the defect either because of the difficulty of
discovery,181 or because the seller’s assurances induced the
acceptance without discovery.182 Revocation of acceptance must
occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers, or
should have discovered the asserted grounds, and before any
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not
caused by the defective condition of the goods.183 For example,
180. E.g., Koch Supplies, Inc. v. Farm Fresh Meats, Inc., 630 F.2d 282, 286
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that for the buyer of a smokehouse who accepted
delivery two to three weeks after discovery of a defect, revocation of
acceptance six months after receipt of the smokehouse was effective given past
dealings between the parties and the seller’s continued efforts to repair the
smokehouse); Plastic Moldings Corp. v. Park Sherman Co., 606 F.2d 117, 122
(6th Cir. 1979) (noting that an acceptance made on the reasonable assumption
that the defects could be cured can be lawfully revoked if the cure is not
forthcoming); Contours, Inc. v. Lee, 874 P.2d 1100, 1106 (Haw. Ct. App.1994)
(holding that revocation was unavailable for a buyer who accepted furniture in
an uncompleted condition, with seller’s assurances of completion, because the
buyer prevented the completion).
181. E.g., Atlan Indus., Inc. v. O.E.M., Inc., 555 F.Supp.184, 188 (W.D.
Okla. 1983) (noting that a buyer may revoke acceptance if the acceptance was
reasonably induced by the difficulty of discovery); J.F. Daley Int'l, Ltd. v.
Midwest Container & Indus. Supply Co., 849 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Mo. 1993)
(finding that latent defects in plastic bottles were not discovered until after
buyer processed them for its use).
182. E.g., Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 1418 (D. Vt. 1986) (holding
that a buyer of a breeding stallion was induced to accept the horse without
discovery of defects due to seller’s assurances that it would conduct breeding
soundness tests and that the horse was breeding sound); Hart Honey Co. v.
Cudworth, 446 N.W.2d 742, 745–46 (N.D. 1989) (finding a seller of honey
storage equipment who was unavailable for the buyer’s inspection represented
that equipment containing live beehives and shown to the buyer from a
distance was of the same type and condition as the equipment being
purchased by the buyer; the buyer’s acceptance was induced by the difficulty
in inspecting the equipment and by seller’s assurances).
183. E.g. Royal Typewriter Co., a Div. of Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v.
Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
that when the buyer attempted to return the goods seventeen months after
receiving the goods substantial change existed due to the use, improper
maintenance, and modifications to the goods); Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg &
Beck Div., Borg–Warner Corp., 578 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(holding that the buyer could not revoke acceptance because the buyer
substantially changed the condition of the good by stamping the purchased
steel into parts); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F.
Supp. 364, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (holding that the buyer’s continued use and
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cutting fabric into panels184 or pressing or molding aluminum
sheets into forms for auto parts185 are the kinds of substantial
changes that bar revocation of acceptance. Unlike the return of
non-conforming goods that might be resold to another customer
at a discounted price, returning substantially modified goods to
the seller thrusts upon the seller goods it may have difficulty
selling. The seller may lack a ready market for modified goods,
or lack the knowledge necessary to market the substantially
changed goods. The buyer who cannot revoke its acceptance
may, however, use the Code’s damage remedy for accepted
goods or breach of warranty, provided by Section 2–714.186 A
buyer who revokes its acceptance has the same rights and
obligations towards the goods as the buyer who rejects the

depreciation of the purchased machine over a period approaching its life
expectancy amounts to a clear substantial change in condition); Stridiron v.
I.C., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D. Va. 1984) (holding that the use of car for
six months and 6,833 miles, relying on seller’s assurances of cure, was not a
substantial change in the condition of the goods so as to defeat revocation of
acceptance).
184. Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d 255, 257–58 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that there was a substantial change in the condition of the
goods barring the buyer from revoking acceptance when the buyer discovered
a defect that was not discoverable until after the buyer cut the fabric into
roman shades). But cf. Deere & Co. v. Johnson, 271 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir.
2001) (noting that simple depreciation alone usually does not constitute a
substantial change in the condition of the goods); Lackawanna Leather Co. v.
Martin & Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1197, 1202–03 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that
the buyer’s revocation of acceptance of purchased hides was a question for the
jury because the evidence showed (1) the defects in the hides could not have
been discovered without processing (2) that the seller knew from the beginning
that the buyer would be processing the goods for use in its business and (3) the
buyer’s processing of the hides after discovery of the defect enhanced their
value); ARB, Inc. v. E–Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 197–98 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(finding damage naturally flowing from the attempts to make the equipment
work was neither inconsistent with the seller's ownership nor a substantial
change within the meaning of § 2–608).
185. Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & Beck Div., Borg–Warner Corp., 578 F.
Supp. 1081, 1087–88 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff’d, 762 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1985).
186. U.C.C. § 2–714 (2011) (“Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to
Accepted Goods: (1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification
(subsection (3) of Section 2–607) he may recover as damages for any non–
conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from
the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable. (2) The
measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount. (3) In a proper case any
incidental and consequential damages under the next section may also be
recovered.”).
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goods.187
C. THE GOODS ORIENTED REMEDIES OF THE CONVENTION –
ONE LOT DELIVERIES, NON–INSTALMENT CONTRACTS
Unlike the Code, which gives the buyer a reasonable time
to reject the goods after their delivery or tender,188 the
Convention mandates prompt examination of the goods within
as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances.189
Circumstances used for determining the promptness of the
buyer’s examination include: the method of delivery including
the “kind” of packaging of the goods,190 the quantity
delivered,191 the nature of the goods,192 the skill of the buyer’s
employees,193 the nature of the defect,194 the obviousness of the
defect,195 the number or deliveries, and the steps that must be
187. Id. § 2–608(3) (2011). For a discussion of the merchant buyer’s
obligation to care for the goods, see text and note, supra note 61.
188. U.C.C. § 2–602(1) (2011). For a discussion of the right to reject
pursuant to the Code, see text and notes, supra note 139.
189. CISG, supra note 1, art. 38 (1).
190. Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken [OLG] [higher regional court] Jan. 13,
1993,
1
U
69/92
(Ger.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=180; Obergericht Kanton Luzern [OG]
[appellate court] Jan. 8, 1997, 11 95 123/357 (Switz.), English translation
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970108s1.html.
191. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Aug. 27, 1999, 1 Ob
223/99x
(Austria),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html.
192. Arrondissementsrechtbank Breda [Rb.] [district court] Jan. 16, 2009,
197586 / KG ZA 08–659 (Neth.), English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090116n1.html.
193. Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [ordinary court of appeals] June 17, 1997
96/449,
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=317&step=Abstract
;
Oberlandesgericht München [OLG] [higher regional court] Mar. 11, 1998, 7 U
4427/97
(Ger.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=299 (“[B]uyer was an expert merchant,
who usually sold high value clothes, it could have become aware of the lack of
conformity by spot check examination and could have given notice of lack of
conformity much earlier.”).
194. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 3, 1999, VIII
ZR
287/98
(Ger.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&id=447&do=case (finding that the
defect was only discoverable after expert examination); Obergericht Kanton
Luzern[OG][appellate court] Jan. 8, 1997, 11 95 123/357 (Switz.), English
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970108s1.html
(finding that the determination of the time for examination must take into
account the nature of the goods, the quantity, the kind of wrapping and all
other relevant circumstances).
195. Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [appellate court] Jan. 28, 2010, 87379/
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taken to discover the defect.196 The Convention only obligates
the buyer to discover those defects that a normal examination,
one consistent with trade custom or the practices between the
parties, would reveal.197 If the buyer later complains of a
particular defect that could have been discovered by immediate
inspection and testing of the goods upon delivery, the buyer has
no recourse because Article 38 of the Convention imposes a
duty on the buyer to have examined the goods and to have
discovered the defect by random inspection.198 This prompt
inspection of the goods must be followed by notice of the nature
of the defect within a reasonable time.199 A recent case
addressed by the Netherlands Appellate Court illustrates the
general approach to prompt examination and notice within a
reasonable time under Article 38 of the Convention.200 The
Spanish seller delivered lemons to a buyer at its place of
business in the Netherlands.201 The buyer examined the lemons
and determined they were not of acceptable quality on the day
of delivery.202 However, the buyer gave the seller notice of the
non-conformity twelve days after the delivery.203 The court held
that the buyer’s notice was untimely; the obvious nature of the
defect and the perishable character of the goods required
considerably earlier notice.204
The period for examination commences at the time of
HAZA
07–716
(Neth.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100128n1.html (finding that the obvious
nature of the defect and the perishable character of the goods required notice
earlier than twelve days after delivery).
196. Landgericht Berlin [LG] [regional court] Mar. 21, 2003, 103 O 213/02
(Ger.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&id=921&do=case (finding that while
the defects in the cloth were only detectable when dyed, the buyer should have
dyed a sample shortly after delivery to test for defects).
197. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Aug. 27, 1999, 1 Ob
223/99x
(Austria),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html (noting that the lack of
conformity preserves only the right to claim the sufficiently specified defects
and that a notification of other defects afterwards is not possible).
198. Id.
199. CISG, supra note 1, art. 39 (1).
200. Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [appellate court] Jan. 28, 2010, 87379/
HAZA
07–716
(Neth.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100128n1.html.
201. Id. ¶ 4.1.
202. Id. ¶ 4.3.
203. Id. ¶ 4.3.
204. Id. ¶ 4.4.
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delivery and transfer of the risk of loss;205 industry usages and
practices may dictate the required manner of examination.206
Citing Austrian law, the Austrian Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court’s determination that the buyer had the burden of
proof on the timeliness and sufficiency of its notice.207 It held
that the purchase of a large quantity of goods requires the use
of experts in the field to examine the goods.208 This holding is
contrary to calculating the time for and duration of an
examination period based on the quantity of the goods or the
expertise of the buyer’s employees. It does, however, indicate a
strong preference for an expeditious means of examination.
The examination of perishables, such as citrus fruit, must
take place without delay because the goods may be exposed to
damage or decay during their transport.209 In a contract that
does not impose on the seller the obligation to hand the goods
over at a particular place or to a carrier because the parties use
a delivery term, such as EXW (Incoterms),210 timely
examination by the buyer may only be possible before it
commences the transporting of the goods from the seller’s place
of business or storage facility.211 However, the seller’s delivery
to a particular place or to a carrier results in the shifting of the
risk of loss at that designated place such as FAS Port Said

205. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 67–69.
206. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Aug. 27, 1999, 1 Ob
223/99x
(Austria),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html.
207. Id.; see also CISG, supra note 1, at 295–298; JOHN HONNOLD,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES,
¶¶ 177–178, at 330, ¶ 70.1, at 86–92 (4th ed. 1989) (stating that unless
expressly provided, CISG does not address the allocation of the burden of
proof). But Cf. Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, Articles 3, in
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 61, 72, ¶ 22 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed.
2005). (recognizing the reluctance of the Vienna Convention to address
burdens of proof but opining that the Convention and not domestic law
implicitly governs the allocation of the burden of proof).
208. [OGH] 1 Ob 223/99x (Austria).
209. See Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [appellate court] Jan. 28, 2010, 87379/
HAZA
07–716
(Neth.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100128n1.html.
210. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 92, at 15 (“’Ex Works’
means that the seller delivers when it places the goods at the disposal of the
buyer at the seller’s premises or at another named place.”).
211. Gerechtshof Arnhem [Hof] [appellate court] Jan. 28, 2010, 87379/
HAZA
07–716
(Neth.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100128n1.html.
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Egypt,212 or upon delivery to the carrier. The wise buyer should
examine perishable goods, or engage a third party to examine
the goods, upon delivery at the designated place, or before
transport by the carrier.213 Prompt examination by the buyer
may only be deferred beyond the point of the seller’s delivery if
all the goods to be delivered by the seller are redirected or re–
dispatched by the buyer while the goods are in transit.214 If the
buyer receives the goods and then immediately resells a small
portion, deferral of the examination is inappropriate. Deferral
is only available if the buyer does not have a real opportunity to
examine or to have the goods examined.215
1. The Buyer’s Notice of the Non-conforming Goods
Article 39 of the Convention imposes on the buyer an
obligation to give notice specifying the nature of the lack of
conformity, within a reasonable time after discovery or from
the time it ought to have been discovered, but no more than two
years from the date on which the goods were handed over to the
buyer.216 The buyer loses the right to rely on non-conformity as
a basis for its claim if notice is untimely. The ease with which
discovery may be made is a factor for determining whether the
examination was within “as short a period as practicable” and
whether the notice of the defect was given within a reasonable
time.217 The following cases illustrate the promptness required
by national courts and arbitration tribunals: sterile wrapped
medical devices packed in boxes required ten days for prompt
examination and thirty days from delivery for Article 39 notice
because the defect could be viewed through the packaging;218
212. See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text.
213. See generally 18 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:19
(4th ed. 2012) (noting that determination under the UCC of whether the buyer
should have inspected the goods within a particular time depends upon the
difficulty of discovering defects in the goods and their perishability, among
other factors).
214. CISG, supra note 1, art. 38(3).
215. See id., art. 38(2).
216. See id., art. 39.
217. See Pretura di Locarno–Campagna [district court] Apr. 27, 1992, 6252
(Switz.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920427s1.html.
218. Obergericht Kanton Luzern [OG] [appellate court] Jan. 8, 1997, 11 95
123/357
(Switz.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970108s1.html (holding that thirty days of
notice is appropriate, compared to the short German eight day period and the
longer Dutch period of several months).
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trekking shoes delivered to the buyer’s end user in partial
deliveries required examination of each delivery, and a total of
14 days for both the examination and the Article 39 notice was
imposed unless special circumstances are established by the
buyer, such as the quantity delivered or the defect required
examination by a professional.219 These holdings illustrate that
a buyer should negotiate for an agreed–to period for
examination and notice, given the demands that courts place on
buyers. Article 6 of the Convention allows buyers and sellers to
negotiate terms that vary from the Convention.220
Courts have imposed sampling on buyers that have argued
that either the packaging or the nature of the goods
necessitated the delaying of examination until the goods were
resold to its end–users. Courts were unconvinced by that
argument in the following types of cases: defects in individually
wrapped doors were repetitive and easily recognizable,
therefore, the buyer could have discovered the defects by
examining samples;221 defects in cloth were only detectable
once the cloth was dyed, because the buyer should have dyed a
sample of the cloth shortly after delivery an examination seven
weeks after delivery was untimely.222 This pattern of cases also
suggests that if a method of discovery could have been
employed by the buyer, buyer should have employed that
method.223
Defects in prior deliveries may impact the required scope of
an examination of subsequently delivered goods. For example,
a buyer ordered goods for delivery to its end user and received
219. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Aug. 27, 1999, 1 Ob
223/99x
(Austria),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html.
220. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application of
this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any
of its provisions.”); see, e.g., Arrondissementsrechtbank Zwolle [Rb.] [district
court] Mar. 5, 1997, HA ZA 95–640 (Neth.), English abstract available
athttp://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=332&step=Keywords
(holding that as a result of the seller’s standard terms on notice, trade custom,
nature of the goods (fish) and the buyer’s expertise, buyer’s notice was
untimely).
221. Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken [OLG] [higher regional court] Jan. 13,
1993,
1
U
69/92
(Ger.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=180.
222. Landgericht Berlin [LG] [regional court] Mar. 21, 2003, 103 O 213/02
(Ger.), English abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&id.
223. See, e.g., Obergericht Kanton Luzern [OG] [appellate court] Jan. 8,
1997, 11 95 123/357 (Switz.), English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970108s1.html.
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notice from its end user of defects in the first delivery of forty–
eight pairs of shoes after the buyer had placed a second
identical order with the same seller. The buyer’s random,
“sampling,” examination of the second delivery without
discovering any defects was held an ineffective manner of
examination. The buyer’s notice of the non-conformity sixteen
days after the second delivery was untimely.224 The buyer that
fails to provide timely notice is not, however, without a remedy.
Article 44 of the Convention permits the buyer that has a
reasonable excuse for failing to give the required notice to use
the price reduction remedy,225 or to recover damages, except its
lost profits.226 In the relatively few cases and arbitration
awards that have addressed the question of the buyer’s
purported “excuse” of its untimely notice, and not its untimely
examination, only in those instances when the buyer’s untimely
notice was not the result of the buyer’s neglect or
inattentiveness has relief been granted.227

224. Landgericht Stuttgart [LG] [regional court] Aug. 31, 1989, 3 KfH 0
97/89
(Ger.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1.
225. CISG, supra note 1, art. 50.
226. Id. art. 44 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of article
39 and paragraph (1) of article 43, the buyer may reduce the price in
accordance with article 50 or claim damages, except for loss of profit, if he has
a reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice.”).
227. The parties jointly appointed a third party to inspect and certify the
quality of coke when the goods were loaded in China, the place of delivery. The
buyer in good faith relied on the accuracy of the certificate regarding the
conformity of the goods and did not independently inspect the coke until it
arrived in Germany. Case No. 9187 of 1999, ICC Int’l Ct. of Arb., English
translation available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=466 (finding notice
of non-conformity to the seller was untimely, the Tribunal permitted recovery
of the cost of storing and reselling the coke, and the loss incurred from
blending the coke with a higher grade purchased, but not the buyer’s
anticipated profit). See Camilla Baasch Andersen, Exceptions to the
Notification Rule – Are They Uniformly Interpreted?, 9 VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L
COMM. L. & ARB. § 3.4 at 39–42 (2005) (arguing that reasonable excuse is
directed to the untimeliness of notice rather than the untimeliness of the
examination). But see Tribunal of Int’l Commercial Arb. at the Russian
Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Jan. 24, 2000, 54/1999 (Rus.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000124r1.html (finding the buyer’s inspection
of the goods in the loading port as required by the contract had been
economically and technically inadequate; the buyer’s postponement of the
quality check until the goods arrived at the port of destination was, therefore,
considered reasonable by the tribunal and the buyer was entitle to a price
reduction).
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2. Technical Requirements for Notice and the Seller’s
Waiver of the Defense of Untimely Notice
Article 39 of the Convention does not specify the form or
method for giving the required notice. Although it ruled that
written notice was required, the Serbian Chamber of
Commerce Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration found, consistent
with the terms of Article 13 of the Convention,228 that the
writing requirement was satisfied by an electronic
transmission, which is this case was a fax.229 Courts have held
notice by telephone to be permissible.230 The buyer’s obligation
of satisfying the burden of proof may become a challenge if the
seller asserts that the call was not received or disputes the
asserted contents of the conversation. The German
Bundesgerichtshof ruled that a buyer implicitly declared the
contract avoided by giving notice that it could not make use of a
certain quantity of the goods and by placing those goods at the
seller’s disposal.231 If the contract can be avoided by conduct,
Article 39 notice could likewise arise from implication. The
weakness in this argument is that only notice that specifies the
nature of the lack of conformity satisfies the notice
requirement.232 Consequently, notice by conduct is likely to be
insufficient.
Several courts have held that conduct by a seller can
constitute a waiver of the right to raise an untimely notice of
the lack of conformity defense. A German seller who declared
that it would be liable for present or future justified complaints
regarding the conformity of the goods waived the defense of
untimely notice.233 Likewise, an Austrian seller that made
228. CISG, supra note 1, art. 13 (“For the purposes of this Convention
‘writing’ includes telegram and telex.”).
229. Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration [attached to the Serbian Chamber
of Commerce] Nov. 06, 2005, T–10/04 (Serb.), English translation available at
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051106sb.html (noting that because the time of the
transmission couldn’t be verified by the buyer the arbitrator could not find
that the buyer provided timely notice).
230. See, e.g., Landgericht Stuttgart [LG] [regional court] Aug. 31, 1989, 3
KfH
0
97/89
(Ger.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1.
231. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 25, 1997
VIII
ZR
300/96
(Ger.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970625g2.html.
232. HENRY GABRIEL, CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARISON
OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (2009).
233. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 25, 1997
VIII
ZR
300/96
(Ger.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970625g2.html.
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repairs waived the right to defend on the grounds of untimely
notice.234 Another seller implicitly waived its right to rely on
untimely notice as a defense by retaking the goods and
agreeing to exchange them without making its own
examination of the goods.235
Most importantly, however, is the prohibition imposed by
Article 40 of the Convention that bars a seller, who knew or
could not have been unaware of the defective condition of its
goods and failed to disclose those facts to the buyer, from
relying on the buyer’s failure to meet the requirements of
prompt examination and reasonable notice if the lack of
conformity.236 Implicit in this requirement is a threaded policy
of timely communication and disclosure imposed by several of
the provisions.237 Although the Convention does not impose a
general duty of good faith on the parties, many of its provisions
reflect general policies that are harmonious with good faith in
domestic law such as the duty to communicate reflected in
Article 40.238
3. Avoidance, the Convention’s Ultimate Remedy for
Returning the Goods
When the seller tenders or delivers non-conforming goods,
the buyer whose contract is governed by the Code may find it
necessary to use either, or both, of the goods oriented remedies
provided by the Code: rejection,239 available for any non-

234. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Apr. 2, 2009, 8 Ob
125/08b
(Austria),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090402a3.html (finding that the buyer failed
to raise the question of waiver in the Court of First Instance).
235. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] July 5, 2001, 6 OB
117/01a
(Austria),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010705a3.html
236. CISG, supra note 1, art. 40.
237. See HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 100 (citing CISG, supra note 1, arts.
19 (2), 21 (2), 26, 39 (1), 48 (2), 65, 71 (3), 72 (2), 79 (4), and 88 (1) (interpreting
that the CISG as imposing a duty to communicate); Sarah Howard Jenkins,
Construing Laws Governing International and U.S. Domestic Contracts for the
Sale of Goods: A Comparative Evaluation of the CISG and UCC Rules of
Interpretation, 26 TEMPLE J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2012).
238. For a comparative assessment of the good faith duty imposed by
domestic contract law and the interpretative guideline of good faith in
international trade espoused by Article 7 of the Convention, see Jenkins, supra
note 237.
239. For a discussion of the Code remedy of rejection, see supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
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conformity, and revocation of acceptance,240 which is only
available for substantial impairments in value. Similarly, the
Convention provides two goods oriented remedies: avoidance241
and a request for substitute goods.242 Unlike the Code, the
standard applicable for the Convention’s two remedies is the
same, a fundamental breach of contract.243 The first of these
two remedies, avoidance, is a remedy of last resort and is the
functional equivalent of the cancellation of a contract that is
subject to the Code.244 Avoidance reflects the policy goals of
preserving the contractual relationship and minimizing the
waste of resources expended for transporting, delivering, and
returning goods. If the buyer has not obtained what it expected
from the contract, adjustments must be obtained by permitting
repair of the goods, seeking a price reduction, or recovering
damages. Upon avoidance, both parties are released from their
obligations under the contract, subject to any claim for
damages that are due,245 and must make restitution of the
240. For a discussion of the Code remedy of rejection, see supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
241. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49 (“(1) The buyer may declare the contract
avoided: (a) If the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under
the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract;
or (b) In case of non–delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the
additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1)
of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. (2)
However, in cases where the seller has delivered the goods, the buyer loses the
right to declare the contract avoided unless he does so: (a) In respect of late
delivery, within a reasonable time after he has become aware that delivery
has been made; (b) In respect of any breach other than late delivery, within a
reasonable time: (i) After he knew or ought to have known of the breach; (ii)
After the expiration of any additional period of time fixed by the buyer in
accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47, or after the seller has declared
that he will not perform his obligations within such an additional period; or
(iii) After the expiration of any additional period of time indicated by the seller
in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 48, or after the buyer has declared
that he will not accept performance”).
242. Id. art. 46(2) (“If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer
may require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity
constitutes a fundamental breach of contract and a request for substitute
goods is made either in conjunction with notice given under article 39 or
within a reasonable time thereafter.”).
243. Id. art. 25 (“A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is
fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially
to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the
party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in
the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.”).
244. U.C.C. § 2–106(4) (2011).
245. CISG, supra note 1, art. 81(1) (“Avoidance of the contract releases
both parties from their obligations under it, subject to any damages which
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performance received by the other unless excused.246 Although
avoidance is similar in effect to rejection and revocation of
acceptance, the conditions precedent to the right to avoid a
contract are distinguishable and the conduct of the parties
preceding an effective avoidance, course of performance in Code
nomenclature, may have a substantially different effect in a
contract subject to the Convention compared to one subject to
the Code.247 Consequently, course of performance, or conduct
after notice of the breach and before notice of avoidance, may
pose a substantial trap for domestic parties who are
accustomed to attempting repairs and to interacting with their
sellers without adversely impacting rights derived from the
Code.
4. Avoidance – The Conditions Precedent to an Effective
Avoidance
The Convention recognizes two contextual patterns that
give the buyer a right to avoid the contract.248 First, there is a
fundamental breach by the seller in performing any of its
obligations under the contract or the Convention.249 Second, the
seller fails to deliver the goods; thereafter, the buyer gives the
may be due. Avoidance does not affect any provision of the contract for the
settlement of disputes or any other provision of the contract governing the
rights and obligations of the parties consequent upon the avoidance of the
contract.”).
246. Id. art. 82 (“(1) The buyer loses the right to declare the contract
avoided or to require the seller to deliver substitute goods if it is impossible for
him to make restitution of the goods substantially in the condition in which he
received them. (2) The preceding paragraph does not apply: (a) If the
impossibility of making restitution of the goods or of making restitution of the
goods substantially in the condition in which the buyer received them is not
due to his act or omission; (b) If the goods or part of the goods have perished or
deteriorated as a result of the examination provided for in article 38; or (c) If
the goods or part of the goods have been sold in the normal course of business
or have been consumed or transformed by the buyer in the course normal use
before he discovered or ought to have discovered the lack of conformity.”); Id.,
art. 84 (“(1) If the seller is bound to refund the price, he must also pay interest
on it, from the date on which the price was paid. (2) The buyer must account to
the seller for all benefits which he has derived from the goods or part of them:
(a) If he must make restitution of the goods or part of them; or (b) If it is
impossible for him to make restitution of all or part of the goods or to make
restitution of all or part of the goods substantially in the condition in which he
received them, but he has nevertheless declared the contract avoided or
required the seller to deliver substitute goods.”).
247. For a discussion of the determination of a reasonable time to reject
and to revoke acceptance, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
248. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 287.
249. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(a).
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seller an additional period of time for performing but the seller
does not deliver the goods within the additional period of time,
or the seller declares that it will not deliver within that
period.250 In both of these cases, the buyer may exercise the
right of avoidance. This latter category, referred to as Nachfrist
notice, was inspired by the German law Nachfrist: one who
gives notice extending time for performance to a further
definite time.251 Here, a seller’s non–fundamental breach of
delay matures into a basis for avoiding the contract by the
seller’s failing to perform within the extended period granted
for performing.252 The former, the fundamental breach of the
seller’s obligation to deliver conforming goods, is the focus of
this article.
a. The Delivery of Non-conforming Goods and
Avoidance
The seller’s delivery of non-conforming goods must
constitute a fundamental breach before the buyer may declare
the contract avoided.253 One leading commentator suggests that
the policy goals of Article 49 of the Convention reflected in the
fundamental breach standard support a requirement of
postponing the buyer’s right to determine the existence of a
fundamental breach until after the seller fails to cure the nonconformity within a reasonable time, until that point, he
argues, no fundamental breach has occurred.254 This analysis
misses the mark and places the buyer at risk in meeting its
required notice of the fundamental breach within a reasonable
time after he knew or ought to have known of the breach.255 The
buyer’s notice of avoidance is distinguishable from the Article
39 notice of non–conformity of the delivered goods after a
prompt examination, unless the examination at delivery
250. Id. arts. 47(1), 49(1)(b).
251. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 290.
252. UNCITRAL, Digest of Article 25 Case Law, DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
§ 6 (2008) available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest–art–
25.html. For a discussion of whether the seller’s failure to cure after an
extension in time operates as a Nachfrist notice resulting in a right of
avoidance see supra note 251 and accompanying text.
253. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1).
254. Peter Schlechtriem, Article 25, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 281, 294, ¶ 20(aa) (Peter
Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005).
255. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(2)(b)(i).
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reveals a fundamental breach. If the breach is fundamental
either at delivery or discovered thereafter, the reasonable time
for avoidance commences at the point the buyer knew or ought
to have known of the fundamental breach.256 Should the buyer
fail to provide this notice within the required time frame, it
loses the right to avoid the contract.257 A buyer who must wait
for the seller to provide seasonable notice of its intent to cure
the non-conformity may be subsequently held to have itself
acted in an unreasonable manner. How long must the buyer
wait? Assume the buyer takes delivery of goods that fail to
meet the agreed standard of quality and the buyer determines
that the seller should have provided notice of its intent to cure
within ten days after receiving the buyer’s notice of a lack of
conformity. Thereafter, the buyer gives notice of avoidance. The
buyer’s calculation of seasonable notice by the seller creates a
factual issue that may later be resolved against the buyer. The
exercise of the right of avoidance as a result of seller’s delivery
of non-conforming goods arises when the buyer determines that
its expectations created by the contract or Convention have not
been met. If the breach “results in such a detriment to the
other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is
entitled to expect under the contract,”258 the breach is
fundamental and the buyer should provide notice of avoidance
within a reasonable time of that discovery.259
Courts of contracting states are uniform in requiring a
serious or severe failure by the seller, such as: the tender of
imitations of branded Intel Pentium CPUs where the adverse
impact on the buyer’s reputation in using such goods would be
substantial;260 or superficial cracks hidden by lamination mark
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. art. 25 (“A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is
fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially
to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the
party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in
the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.”).
259. See, e.g., Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court of Poland] May 11, 2007, V
CSK
456/06
(Pol.),
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070511p1.html; see also Cour d’Appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Versailles, 12e ch, Jan. 29, 1998, R.G. no. 56 (Fr.),
English abstract available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=280 (finding
that notice of non–conformity was reasonable in a case involving a buyer who
could not use the defective machines as expected).
260. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Jul. 5, 2001, docket No.
6 Ob 117/01a, ENTSCHEIDUNGS DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN OBERSTEN
GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] (Austria), translation available at
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on tendered steel rods are unfit for their intended use by the
buyer for manufacturing axle spindles that are welded and
form an integral part of axles on buses and other vehicles.261 If
the non-conformity of tendered goods is such that it “cannot be
remedied within reasonable time and by reasonable effort to
the effect that the goods are practically useless,
unmerchantable or cannot be appropriately resold,”262 a
fundamental breach has occurred. The buyer’s substantial
deprivation may result from an insubstantial or a slight defect
or delay if, based on the contract, the defect or timeliness was
of basic importance for one of the contracting parties.263 To
determine if a breach substantially deprives the other party of
what it was entitled to expect under the contract, analysis
commences with an assessment of the parties’ agreement and
their evaluation of the importance of the performance.264 In a
contract for a particular variety of Christmas trees, the buyer
specified the percentage of first and good second class trees and
described the quality, height, and price of the trees.265 The
seller’s delivery of the proper quality of trees, but not of the
requested height, was a fundamental breach.266
A severe depravation sustained by the buyer’s is only part
of the formulation for the fundamental breach standard. The
test of the buyer’s depravation is subject to an exception or
excuse for the seller: did the seller foresee, and would a
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=905.
261. S.A.P., Jul 30, 2010 (R.A.J. No. 169/2010) (Spain), English abstract
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100730s4.html.
262. Bundesgerichtshof [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court], May 18, 2009,
docket
no.
A_68/2009
(Switz.),
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090518s1.html.
263. See, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] May 23, 2005,
docket No. 3Ob193/04k, ENTSCHEIDUNGS DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN OBERSTEN
GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] (Austria), translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050523a3.html.
264. See, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] June. 21, 2005,
docket No. 5 Ob 45/05m ENTSCHEIDUNGS DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN OBERSTEN
GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] (Austria), translation available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1047; see also S.T.S., Jan. 17, 2008 (R.A.J.
81.2001)
(Spain)
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080117s4.html
(explaining
that
no
fundamental breach occurred when the seller tendered 300 used automobiles,
as required by the contract, with scratches and dents from ordinary use).
265. Vestre Landsret [Western High Court], Nov. 10, 1999, docket no. B–
29–1998
(Den.),
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991110d1.html.
266. Id.
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reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances
foresee, such a result?267 The applicability of this exception
based on objective foreseeability has been characterized by a
Spanish court as a “lack of predictability of the outcome would
create a situation that could be regarded as a fortuitous event
or one of force majeure.”268 Whether from the express terms of
the agreements, the negotiations, practices between the
parties,269 or seller’s knowledge of the buyer’s intended use or
knowledge of industry standards, if the seller or a reasonable
person in the seller’s position could foresee the substantial
depravation of the buyer’s expectations, no excuse is available
for the seller.270
The presence of an excuse or exemption in the standard
raises the question of timing. When must the seller have notice
of the essential nature of the buyer’s use or expectation? The
alternatives are varied: at the conclusion of the contract, before
the seller’s performance, or at the time of the breach? Some
authorities argue that the timing of foreseeability is consistent
with that provided in the predecessor provision in the Hague
Convention on Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods, Article 10.271 Therefore, the seller must foresee the
results, the buyer’s severe deprivation from the breach, at the
conclusion of the contract.272 There is contrary and persuasive
authority, including the legislative history of Article 25, which
267. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 25.
268. S.A.P., July 30, 2010 (R.A.J. No. 169/2010) (Spain) (quoting S.T.S.,
Jan. 17, 2008 (R.A.J. 81.2001) (Spain)), English abstract available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100730s4.html (“[Fundamental breach is] a
system of contractual liability based on a criterion of objective imputation,
attenuated, however, by exceptions—corresponding to the hypotheses of
fortuitous events and force majeure under domestic law—and by a parameter
of reasonableness.”).
269. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any usage
to which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established
between themselves.”); see, e.g., Landgericht Ellwangen [LG] [regional court]
Aug. 21, 1995, 1 KfH O 32/95 (Ger.), English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g2.html (holding that based on
previous commercial relationships parties impliedly agreed that the goods
should comply with German standards for food).
270. Schlechtriem, supra note 254, para.12–6 at 288–91.
271. United Nations Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Aug. 23, 1972, 834
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 10 at 189 (“An acceptance cannot be revoked except by a
revocation which is communicated to the offer or before or at the same time as
the acceptance.”).
272. Schlechtriem, supra note 254, para.15 n.50, at 290.
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rejects the prior uniform law’s approach that foreseeability is
tested at the conclusion of the contract.273 If communications
between the parties, or other knowledge is received by the
seller, that clarifies the importance of an aspect of seller’s
performance in advance of its performance, or the parties agree
to modify the terms of the contract, the test of foreseeability
must include the knowledge of the buyer’s expectation as
influenced by the clarification or modification of the contract.274
“However, information receive[d] too late to affect performance
seems outside the scope of Article 25 . . . the foreseeability
principle presumably is designed to give [the seller] an
opportunity to give special attention to minor details of
performance the importance of which he could not otherwise
have anticipated.”275
5. Timing of the Notice of Avoidance
Avoidance is only accomplished by notice of avoidance. The
reasonable time for giving notice of avoidance commences at
the point the buyer knew or ought to have known of the
fundamental breach.276 Neither complaints nor notification of
breach constitute avoidance. 277 The following cases illustrate
the need for the buyer to expeditiously notify the seller of its
avoidance or cancellation of the contract. A buyer received its
delivery of Christmas trees on December 2 and notified the
seller that the quality of the shipment was “fine,” but the
height was inconsistent with the specifications.278 The buyer
requested a price reduction and the seller refused.279 On
December 4, the buyer gave the same notice and request.280
The seller refused.281 On December 10, the buyer gave notice of
273. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 183, n.5.
274. See, e.g., App., 20 Marzo 1998, Diritto del commercio internazionale,
1999,
455–59
(It.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=275 (deciding that the seller’s failure to
deliver the goods on a fixed date held a fundamental breach when
clarifications between the parties after contracting affirmed the importance of
the date and the buyer expected to receive the goods before end of year sales).
275. HONNOLD, supra note 60, § 183, at 277.
276. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(2)(b)(i).
277. Id. art. 26.
278. Vestre Landsret [Western High Court], Nov. 10, 1999, docket no. B–
29–1998
(Den.),
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991110d1.html.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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avoidance.282 The Denmark Western High Court held that the
buyer’s notice of avoidance on December 10 was untimely
because the season for Christmas trees ended within fourteen
days, thus requiring sale in a short period of time. 283 The court
concluded the trees would be without value.284 Observe that the
attempts to negotiate a price reduction were not used to
enlarge the time for providing reasonable notice of avoidance
but rather robbed the buyer of the right of avoidance.
Moreover, the nature of the goods and the seller’s ability to
resell them impacted the court’s determination of whether
notice was timely. The buyer here is in a difficult position. The
seller has committed a fundamental breach and refused to
negotiate. The buyer’s options were numerous: 1) an effective
avoidance, pushing the goods back on the seller; 2) using the
goods in its business, suing and recovering the difference in
value by using the Article 50 Price Reduction remedy;285
3) rejecting the goods and retaining them pending
reimbursement of its expenses;286 4) storing the goods with a
third party;287 or 5) selling them if they are perishable or if
preserving the rejected goods involves unreasonable expense.288
The trees are perishable; observe that unlike the Code, the
Convention does not require the sale of goods whose value is
subject to rapid devaluation but only those goods that are
subject to rapid deterioration. 289 Christmas trees fall within
the latter category.
Untimely performance may also serve as a basis for
avoidance. Such as a case where a seller fails to deliver the
goods on the date fixed by the contract.290 An Italian buyer and
Hong Kong seller had contracted to sell knitted goods to be
delivered on Dec. 3, 1990.291 The goods were not delivered on
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. CISG, supra note 1, art. 50.
286. Id. art. 86.
287. Id. art. 87.
288. Id. art. 88(2).
289. Id. art. 88.
290. See, e.g., App., 20 Marzo 1998, Diritto del commercio internazionale,
1999,
455–459
(It.),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=275 (the seller’s failure to deliver the goods
on a fixed date held a fundamental breach when clarifications between the
parties after contracting affirmed the importance of the date and the buyer
expected to receive the goods before end of year sales).
291. Id.
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the 3rd so the buyer canceled the purchase order.292 In
interpreting the delivery clause, the court determined that
precise compliance with the delivery term was of fundamental
importance to the buyer and the buyer expected to receive the
goods in time for the holidays.293 The court held that the buyer
was entitled to declare the contract avoided.294 The cancellation
of the purchase order sent by the buyer was equivalent to a
notice of avoidance.295
Article 6 of the Convention empowers parties to vary or
opt–out of any of the provisions.296 A Yugoslav seller and an
Italian buyer concluded a contract for the sale of cow hides. 297
Exercising the right granted by Article 6, the parties agreed
that the buyer would give the seller notice of the lack of
conformity of the goods within one month of their arrival
accompanied by a statement from an independent inspector.298
The buyer lost its right to rely on a lack of conformity because
it did not give notice of the defects within the contractual
period; because the defect was easy to discover, the contractual
notice period was reasonable.299
In another matter, a buyer’s notice of avoidance was timely
when made six days after the seller communicated: 1) that its
obligation of performance was completed, even though the
goods had not been assembled; 2) that the delay in signing the
final acceptance was beyond its control; and 3) that the
guarantee period for the goods had expired.300 Notice of
avoidance was untimely when the buyer discovered that the
goods were non-conforming at delivery, but it did not provide
notice until after an “expertise” (third party inspection).301
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
297. Case No. 7331 of 1994, 6 ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull. 73, English abstract
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=140.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Sales of Technical Equipment, (Russ. v. Austria), VAS–11307/09,
(High Arb. Ct. of Russ. 2009), English abstract available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/091015r1.html.
301. See, e.g., Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 5e ch.,
June 14, 2001, JDI 2002, 483, Obs. Cl. Witz (Fr.), aff’d, Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] com., Sept. 24, 2003, Bull. civ.
2003,
I,
139,
obs.
Philippe
Delebecque
(Fr.),
available
at
http://www.cisg.fr/decision.html?lang=fr.
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Even though origin of the defects could only be ascertained
after an expertise, because the defects themselves were
apparent the buyer should not have waited for the results of
the expertise before asking for avoidance of the contract.302
Finally, a buyer communicated the complaints of its end
user of the non-conformity of coal delivered by the seller five
days after receiving notice from its end user.303 However, the
buyer’s notice of avoidance four months later was untimely.304
The underlying policy goals of rejection, revocation, and
avoidance are similar: preserving the contractual relationship
and minimizing waste. A buyer’s exercise of the right of
avoidance is in effect, substantially similar to a buyer’s exercise
of the power of rejection and revocation of acceptance in a
contract subject to the Code. But, these relative rights are not
identical. Rejection, subject to the seller’s right to cure, is far
more efficient and easily obtainable than either revocation or
avoidance. Avoidance places the most significant burden of
proof on the buyer. The breach must be severe and foreseeable.
Rejection only requires an insubstantial defect and revocation a
substantial impairment of the value to the buyer! Furthermore,
for U.S. domestic parties who are accustomed under the Code
to negotiating and repairing from the time the defect is
discovered until it is clear that the seller cannot rectify its
default, such a course of performance works against the buyer’s
timely avoidance of the contract. The clock for avoidance
commences at the time the buyer knew, or ought to have
known, of the defect, and the clock stops at the end of a
reasonable time. This time period is not extended, as under the
Code, by negotiations between the parties. However, a good
faith interpretation of the Convention prohibits avoidance until
the seller has completed its proffered cure if the buyer has
indicated that it will permit the seller to cure.305 As commercial
parties determine which of the two regimes should govern their
international transaction these are the considerations.

302. Id.
303. Oberlandesgericht München [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal] Mar.,
02, 1994, 7 U 4419/93 (Ger.), English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940302g1.html.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Trib., 12 Dicembre 2001, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale
Privato e Processuale, 2003, 150–155 (It.), English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011213i3.html (holding that buyer’s giving of
notice until seller's attempts at cure failed is not considered as delayed).
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6. Avoidance and Instalment Contracts
An instalment contract is one that requires delivery in
several or separate lots306 and includes separate contracts, if
the contracts are “considered a unitary transaction from an
economic point of view.”307 The Convention empowers the buyer
to exercise the right of avoidance with respect to each
instalment. Unlike the Code, the standard remains the same
for instalment contracts as for unitary (one lot delivery)
contracts; the seller’s fundamental breach of any of its
obligations for any instalment empowers the buyer to avoid the
contract as to that instalment.308 As is often the case, the
seller’s fundamental breach as to one instalment may create an
apprehension regarding the quality of seller’s future
performance of the remaining instalments. Article 73
recognizes that possibility and provides that if a party’s “failure
to perform any of his obligations” with any instalment “gives
the other party good grounds to conclude that a fundamental
breach of contract will occur with respect to future
instalments,”309 future instalments may be avoided as well on
reasonable notice. Courts and tribunals have held that the
buyer has “good grounds” to conclude that a fundamental
breach will occur as to future instalments in a number of cases
justified not only on the quality of the goods delivered but also
the seller’s conduct as a contracting party. If the buyer’s
expectations in the contract are substantially shaken, or its
ability to perform its forward obligations is severely hampered,
306. See Handelsgericht Zürich [HG] [Commercial Court], Feb 5, 1997,
docket no. HG 95 0347 (Switz.), English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970205s1.html (discussing contract for
several deliveries of Italian salad oil); see also Landgericht Ellwangen [LG]
[regional court] Aug. 21, 1995, 1 KfH O 32/95 (Ger.), English translation
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g2.html (discussing an
installment contract for paprika).
307. Barley Case, (Austria v. Pol.), Österreichische Zeitschrift für
Rechtsvergleichung, 1998, 211–20 (Schiedsgericht der Börse für
Landwirtschaftliche Produkte – Wien 1997), English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971210a3.html. Cf. U.C.C. § 2–612(1) (“An
‘installment contract’ is one which requires or authorizes the delivery of goods
in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract contains a
clause ‘each delivery is a separate contract’ or its equivalent.”).
308. CISG, supra note 1, art. 73(1) (“In the case of a contract for delivery of
goods by instalments, if the failure of one party to perform any of his
obligations in respect of any instalment constitutes a fundamental breach of
contract with respect to that instalment, the other party may declare the
contract avoided with respect to that instalment.”).
309. Id. art. 73(2). (emphasis added).
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avoidance of future deliveries becomes an option. The relatively
few cases addressing Article 73 illustrate the breadth of its
application. Avoidance of future deliveries was authorized for
the following “good grounds”: the quality of the goods
delivered;310 the seller’s demand that a price increase for future
deliveries mirror an increase in market price;311 the seller
failed to deliver the first instalment after the buyer set an
additional time period for delivery;312 the pervasiveness of the
non-conformity; a party’s bad faith conduct;313 the seller’s
untimely deliveries affected the buyer’s own production
processes;314 the seller’s ability to supply conforming substitute
goods within a reasonable time was doubtful;315 and a series of
non–fundamental breaches, the cumulative effect of which
gives the buyer “good grounds” to believe that a fundamental
breach will occur in future instalments.316
Finally, not only may the buyer avoid any instalment if it
is fundamentally flawed without having to establish “good
grounds,” the buyer may avoid previous deliveries and future
deliveries that are so interdependent that the buyer’s
contemplated use of the goods cannot be achieved.317
310. See, e.g., Case No. 9887 of 1999, 11 ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull. 109 (2000),
English
abstract
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=469&step=FullText
(deciding that delivery of non-conforming chemical a fundamental breach but
buyer fails to give notice of avoidance).
311. See, e.g., Sour Cherries Case (Austria v. Hung.), Case No: Vb/97142 of
1999 (Hung. Chamber of Commerce and Indus. Ct of Arb.), English abstract
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=425.
312. See, e.g., Handelsgericht Zürich [HG] [Commercial Court], Feb 5,
1997, docket no. HG 95 0347 (Switz.), English translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970205s1.html (deciding that failure to
perform their obligations in respect to the first installment gave the buyer
good grounds for concluding that a fundamental breach would occur also with
respect to future installments).
313. See, e.g., Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, com.,
Feb. 22, 1995, JDI 1995, 632, note Philippe Kahn, English abstract available
at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=83 (holding that buyer misrepresents
the final destination of goods).
314. See, e.g., S.A.P., Nov. 3, 1997 (Revista Jurídica de Catalunya
Jurisprudencia 1998, II, 411 (Sp.), English abstract available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=313.
315. See, e.g., Landgericht Ellwangen [LG] [regional court] Aug. 21, 1995, 1
KfH
O
32/95
(Ger.),
English
translation
available
at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g2.html.
316. See, e.g., Trevor Bennett, Article 73, in BIANCA–BONELL COMMENTARY
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 531–37, ¶ 2.7 (1987).
317. CISG, supra note 1, art. 73(3) (“A buyer who declares the contract
avoided in respect of any delivery may, at the same time, declare it avoided in
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7. The Code – Rejection, Revocation of Acceptance &
Installment Contracts
Regrettably, unlike the Convention, the domestic law
approach to installment contracts is complex and does not
mirror in any respect the standard applicable for the exercise of
the right of rejection in unitary contracts, contracts with a one
lot delivery. In contrast to the perfect tender rule for contracts
that envision a one lot delivery, rejection of an installment is
only available if the value of the installment is substantially
impaired and the non-conformity cannot be cured.318 Unless the
non-conformity of one installment impairs the value of the
whole contract, the buyer must accept a substantially impaired
installment if the seller gives adequate assurance of cure.319
Revocation of this statutorily imposed acceptance becomes an
option for the buyer if the seller fails to seasonably cure the
impairment.320 The foundational policies of the Code, to
maintain the contractual relationship and to facilitate
performance, are reflected in the elevated standards applicable
to installment contracts. These standards protect the seller’s
reliance interest in a contract that requires multiple
performances, unless the value of the whole contract is
substantially impaired. The seller may have entered into
supply contracts for raw materials to be used for its
performances, enlarged its production capacity, purchased new
equipment, expanded its labor force, or otherwise changed its
position in reliance on the agreement.
a. Substantially Impaired Value of an Installment
A substantial impairment in value has been held to be
respect of deliveries already made or of future deliveries if, by reason of their
interdependence, those deliveries could not be used for the purpose
contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract.”).
318. U.C.C. § 2–612 (1) (2001); see also William H. Lawrence, Appropriate
Standards for a Buyer’s Refusal to Keep Goods Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1635, 1635–90 (1994) (encouraging the adoption of the perfect
tender rule for installment contracts in Amended Article 2).
319. See U.C.C. § 2–612(2) (2001).
320. See U.C.C. § 2–608(1)(a); see also Automated Controls, Inc. v. Mic
Enters., Inc., 27 UCC Rep. Serv. 661, 672 (D. Neb. 1978) (finding that the
buyer has the right to cancel an installment contract if the value of the entire
contract is substantially reduced by the non–conformity), aff’d, Automated
Controls, Inc. v. MIC Enters., Inc., 599 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that
MIC has the right to cancel the installments because the defects had
“substantially impaired the value of the whole contract”).
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analogous to a material breach of contract 321 or insubstantial
performance.322 However, the two are distinguishable. Four
primary issues govern the determination of whether the
breaching party’s performance was insubstantial or
substantial: 1) the extent to which the buyer receives its
expected benefit under the contract; 2) whether the deficiency
can be compensated with damages; 3) the extent to which the
breaching party will suffer a forfeiture if the breach is
determined to be material; and 4) likelihood that the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure its failure.323
The buyer’s receipt of its expected benefit from the seller’s
performance is a condition precedent to its duty to accept and
pay for the goods.324 If the loss of benefit resulting from seller’s
failure of performance can be compensated with damages, or
the default in performance can be cured, the breach may be
treated as partial or insubstantial rather than material.
Similarly, if the breaching party has changed position in
reliance on the nonbreaching party’s performance, by acquiring
raw materials or partly performing by manufacturing the
goods, forfeiture may result. In this scenario a forfeiture is “the
denial of compensation that results when the obligee loses his
right to the agreed exchange after he has relied substantially”
by preparing to perform or performing with an expectation of
receiving the agreed compensation.325 In determining the
materiality of the seller’s breach, emphasis is placed on the
interests of the nonbreaching party but requires a weighing of
the relative interests of both the nonbreaching and the

321. See Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging L.L.C. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 965 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (citing Durfee v. Rod Baxter
Imp., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1978)), aff’d, 1998 WL 537592, at *1 (6th
Cir. 1998).
322. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979)
(“In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is
material, the following circumstances are significant: (a) the extent to which
the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for
the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent to which the
party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; (d) the
likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his
failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable
assurances; (e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform
or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.”).
323. Id. at § 241(d)
324. Id. at § 241 cmt. b.
325. Id. § 229 cmt. b.
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breaching party.326 The analysis is designed to reach a
reasonable result in view of similarly situated parties in similar
circumstances.327
The language of UCC Article 2 suggests that substantial
impairment of value to the buyer carries a slightly different
connotation than a determination of a reasonable result based
on similarly situated parties.328 Rather, a substantial
impairment in value to the buyer is based on the buyer’s
specific need, judgment, or perspective even if unknown to the
seller at the time of contracting.329 Substantial impairment
may be based not only on the quality of the goods but also the
timeliness of the seller’s performance, the quantity of the goods
delivered, or the desired assortment of the goods.330 There is,
however, balance in the test. Trivial, insignificant needs are not
cognizable; the severity of the depravation of the anticipated
benefit is the key consideration. A buyer’s subjective need must
also be objectively reasonable.331 If the buyer’s objectively
demonstrated need cannot be cured, the buyer may reject the
installment.332 The likelihood of the seller’s forfeiture is not a
326. See 10 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946 (Interim
ed. 2008).
327. Id.
328. See U.C.C. § 2–608(1) (2001).
329. See id. § 2–608(1) cmt. 2; see also HAWKLAND, supra note 28, § 2–612:3
(“[T]he test is not different from that employed in the doctrine of revocation of
acceptance”); Clemens Pauly, The Concept of Fundamental Breach as an
International Principle to Create Uniformity of Commercial Law, 19 J.L. &
COM. 221, 228 (2000) (stating that under UCC § 2–610 and § 2–612 the two
pronged test of “substantiality” is the same).
330. See U.C.C. § 2–612 cmt. 4 (2001).
331. See Allen v. Rouse Toyota Jeep, Inc., 398 S.E.2d 64, 65 (N.C. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that the substantial impairment test of UCC § 2–608 is a two–
part test which considers both the buyer’s subjective reaction to the alleged
defect and the objective reasonableness of this reaction, taking into account
the good’s market value, reliability, safety, and usefulness for purposes for
which similar goods are used); see also Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller, 362
N.W.2d 704, 707 (Mich. 1984) (holding that revocation of acceptance
appropriate for a car missing a spare tire the buyer’s occupation demanded
that he travel extensively, sometimes in excess of 150 miles per day on Detroit
freeways, and often in the early morning hours and he was afraid of a tire
going flat and of being helpless until morning business hours; the buyer’s fears
were not unreasonable).
332. U.C.C. § 2–612(2) (2001); see, e.g., Graulich Caterer Inc. v. Hans
Holterbosch, Inc., 243 A.2d 253, 261 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1968) (holding
that food vendor’s failure to deliver goods that conformed to the accepted
sample was a substantial impairment because they were incurable and that
the tender of the second non-conforming installment resulted in an
impairment of the whole).

JENKINS - RejRevAvoid (22 MINN J INTL L 152 (Winter 2013))

208

2/21/2013 1:50 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22:1

factor. If the defect cannot be cured; the seller retakes
possession of the rejected goods.333 The seller has the
opportunity to avoid loss by curing its performance. Although
the nature of the breach is substantially similar to that
required for a material breach, establishing a substantial
impairment in value is more readily attainable because the
possibility of the seller’s forfeiture is not weighed as part of the
test.
Assuming the seller gives adequate assurance of cure and
attempts to cure even with an offer of a money allowance,334
what standard is applicable for testing the buyer’s obligation to
accept the cure? The Code is silent on this point. If the
standard of performance in the first instance is substantial
performance, which imposes a duty of acceptance on the buyer
despite insubstantial defects, the standard should not shift to
the perfect tender rule for determining the effectiveness of the
seller’s attempt to cure. If the buyer is obligated to accept an
installment upon the tender of substantially conforming goods
with a right to seek damages for the partial deviation in value,
this standard should remain fixed and is the minimum goal of
any cure.335 An effective cure that meets the substantial
performance standard is also timely.336 Consistent with the
consideration of the timeliness of the tender for determining if
the tendered goods are substantially impaired in value, the
timeliness of the cure is a factor in determining if the cure
achieves the substantial performance test.337 If substantial
333. William H. Lawrence, Appropriate Standards for a Buyer’s Refusal to
Keep Goods Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1635–90
(1994).
334. U.C.C. § 2–612 cmt. 5 (2001) (“Cure . . . can usually be afforded by an
allowance against the price, or . . . further delivery or a partial rejection.”).
335. See Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, 965 F. Supp. at 1013 (W.D.
Mich. 1997) (identifying two possible standards for cure without resolving the
issue because the tendered cure failed both the perfect tender and the
substantial performance standards), aff’d, 1998 WL 537592, at *1 (6th Cir.
1998) (holding that tendering a non-conforming product substantially impairs
the remaining a value of the whole contract and the damages awarded are
commercially reasonable expense to cover the breach).
336. See, e.g., S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 529 (3d
Cir. 1978) (holding that additional requirement of timely delivery is governed
by U.C.C., and concrete supplier’s failure to perform consistent with the
contract schedule for delivery breached the whole contract; contractor’s choice
to continue with the defaulting supplier or use an untested supplemental
supplier was not a failure to mitigate its damages).
337. See Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, 965 F. Supp. at 1012
(holding that tender of cure of the first installment was made within
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performance is achieved, the buyer must accept the goods as
cured and employ rights available through Section 2–714 for
any insubstantial non-conformity to the contract.338 To impose
a perfect tender rule on the seller for determining an effective
cure negates the policy goals of Section 2–612 and conforms the
installment contract standard of substantial performance to a
perfect tender rule any time a seller tenders substantially
impaired goods or insubstantially performs. This penalizes the
seller for its breach and is inconsistent with the fundamental
goal of compensation for breach of contract, rather than
punishment.339 The parties may, however, avoid this effect by
an implied term arising through course of dealings, other
circumstances, or establishing an express term in their
agreement, that mandates strict conformity of the goods
tendered or that defines when an installment is substantially
impaired and cannot be cured.340 Without such a term, if the
seller’s cure fails to satisfy the substantial performance
standard, the buyer should rightfully reject the cure and revoke
its acceptance of the substantially impaired installment—the
buyer accepted the substantially impaired installment
reasonably assuming that the seller would cure the installment
and the non-conformity has not been seasonably cured.341
reasonable time from the original agreed upon delivery date).
338. U.C.C. § 2–714 (2001) (“Buyer’s Damages for Breach in Regard to
Accepted Goods: (1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification
(subsection (3) of Section 2–607) he may recover as damages for any non–
conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from
the seller’s breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable. (2) The
measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount. (3) In a proper case any
incidental and consequential damages under the next section may also be
recovered.”).
339. See U.C.C. § 1–305 (2001) (“[T]he remedies provided by the Uniform
Commercial Code must be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved
party may be put in as good of a position as if the other party had fully
performed”); see also Hubbard v. UTZ Quality Foods, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 444,
450 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the purpose of the substantial impairment
standard is to preclude a buyer from canceling the contract for trivial defects);
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, 730 (4th ed. 2004) (“Our system of
contract remedies is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent breach;
it is aimed, instead, at relief to promisees to redress breach.”) (emphasis
added).
340. U.C.C. § 2–612 cmt. 4 (2011) (stating that strict conformity may apply
because of an express term or circumstances).
341. Id. § 2–608(1)(a).
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b. Substantial Impairment of the Whole Contract
Section 2–612 empowers the buyer to reject any
installment or series of installments that substantially impairs
the value of the whole contract and to treat the tender as a
breach of the whole contract.342 Comment 6 to Section 2–612
cryptically provides that the impact of a non-conforming
installment on the impairment of the whole contract depends
“not on whether such non–conformity indicates an intent or
likelihood that the future deliveries will also be defective, but
whether [it] substantially impairs the value of the whole
contract.”343 When does a non-conforming installment
substantially impair the whole? Plotnick v. Pennsylvania
Smelting & Refining Co., a case interpreting the predecessor
provision to Section 2–612, Section 45(2) of the Uniform Sales
Acts, provides guidance on identifying that conduct which
results in the substantial impairment of the whole contract.344
In Plotnick, a Canadian seller agreed to sell battery lead in 200
ton lots to a Pennsylvania buyer, who promised to pay 8.1 cents
per pound.345 Sixty-three percent of the price was to be paid
immediately after delivery and the balance four weeks after
delivery.346 The parties contemplated full performance of the
agreement no later than December 25, 1947, two months after
they entered their agreement.347 In a rising market, the seller
delivered only one lot before the end of December, one in
January, and, with a balance of 290,000 pounds remaining, a
third in March of 1948.348 Thereafter, the buyer demanded full
performance within thirty days, withheld the price of the third
shipment, and threatened to cover in the open market and sue
for damages.349 Later, the seller canceled the contract and sued
for breach of the whole contract.350 The trial court held that the
buyer’s failure to pay the 63% of the price of the third
installment was a breach, but not a breach of the whole
contract.351 An impairment of the whole contract results, the
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. § 2–612(3).
Id. § 2–612 cmt. 6.
Plotnick v. Pa. Smelting & Ref. Co., 194 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1952).
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id.
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court reasoned:
first, if non–payment for a delivered shipment
may make it impossible or unreasonably
burdensome from a financial point of view for
the seller to supply future installments as
promised. Second, buyer’s breach of his promise
to pay for one installment may create such
reasonable apprehension in the seller’s mind
concerning payment for future installments that
the seller should not be required to take the risk
involved in continuing deliveries.352
Without the buyer’s payment, can the seller acquire the
raw materials to perform the contract? Is the payment or
installment essential for the non–breaching party’s
performance of the agreement? If yes, a substantial impairment
of the whole contract results. Does the buyer’s failure to pay
create a reasonable apprehension about the buyer’s willingness
to pay or its ability to pay?353 If yes, a substantial impairment
of the whole contract results. Likewise, for the buyer, does the
non-conformity, the quality or timing of the seller’s
performance, create a reasonable apprehension regarding the
seller’s willingness or ability to supply goods of the quality,
quantity, or within the time frame required to meet the buyer’s
needs so that it can pay for the contract goods?354 Can the
buyer operate its trade or business as envisioned, producing an
income stream to perform its contractual obligation?355 In
Plotnick, the court concluded that the buyer’s withholding of
the price as a set–off, coupled with its offer to pay 75% rather
352. Id.
353. William H. Lawrence, Appropriate Standards for a Buyer’s Refusal to
Keep Goods Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1635–90
(1994) (arguing that the right to cancel the whole arises from an anticipatory
repudiation of the seller’s obligation not to impair the buyer’s expectations of
the promised performance).
354. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE , § 8–3, at 444 (4th ed. 1995).
355. See, e.g., Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, 965 F. Supp. at 1016
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (material inconvenience or injustice results if aggrieved
party is forced to wait and receive only partial performance because the seller
has repudiated a portion of its obligation). Cf. Bodine Sewer, Inc. v. E. Ill.
Precast, Inc., 493 N.E.2d 705, 713 (Ill. App. Ct.1986) (holding that defective
deliveries pursuant to an installment contract were consistently corrected and
the purchaser, during the time of the contract’s performance, voiced no
concerns with respect to delays occasioned by the defective deliveries, the nonconforming deliveries did not substantially impair the value of the entire
contract).
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than 63% of the price or to pay by sight draft, an instrument
that requires immediate payment upon presentment, indicated
that the buyer did not lack either the willingness or the ability
to perform as agreed, the buyer was not repudiating its
executory performance obligation.356 The Official Comment
directs that apprehension that additional defaults may occur is
an insufficient basis for asserting a breach of the whole.357
Unlike the Convention that mandates one test for avoiding
a unitary contact, an installment, or future deliveries, the Code
requires three different standards. The clarity and ease of
application of one standard on a consistent basis enhances
uniformity of interpretation and uniformity in application
among the national courts, produces a brighter line for parties
seeking to resolve disputes without litigation, and thereby
minimizes the loss of time and resources. The dearth of
domestic case authority on installment suggests that attorneys
hesitate to venture into the complexities of Section 2–612 and
that the goal of the drafting committee of making the section
“more mercantile”358 has failed.
III. CONCLUSION
Agreements for the sale and purchase of goods between
commercial parties with their places of business in different
contracting states are subject to the Convention. Article 6 of the
Convention empowers these parties to vary or derogate from all
its provision but one term. This limitation is only triggered if
one party has its place of business in a contracting that made
an Article 96 Reservation imposing an obligation that
agreements be reduced to a writing.359 Other than this
limitation, the parties may agree to opt–out of the Convention
or to fine tune their agreement as they desire or to contract
with standard terms that vary or derogate from the
Convention. This flexibility is not offered by the Code. Coupled
356. Plotnick, 194 F.2d 859.
357. U.C.C. § 2–612 cmt. 6 (2011).
358. Id. § 2–612, Official Cmt. (2001).
359. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 96 (“A Contracting State whose
legislation requires contracts of sale to be concluded in or evidenced by writing
may at any time make a declaration in accordance with article 12 that any
provision of article 11, article 29, or Part II of this Convention, that allows a
contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer,
acceptance, or other indication of intention to be made in any form other than
in writing, does not apply where any party has his place of business in that
State.”).
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with its inherent flexibility, the Convention offers greater
parity between the parties on the right and obligation to cure.
Buyers are likely to favor the right to compel its seller to make
a substitute delivery or to make repairs that the Convention
authorizes. Sellers are more likely to be drawn to the Code
because only the seller has the right to cure and a buyer cannot
insist on a cure absent a contract term to the contrary.
The Code permits its buyers to extricate themselves in
good faith from an agreement with a one–lot delivery if
tendered or delivered goods have insubstantial defects and the
seller fails to seasonably provide notice of cure. On the other
hand, the Convention imposes an obligation of performance on
the buyer unless a breach is severe and foreseeable. The
distance between the parties and the resulting waste from
shipping and handling cost alone justify the elevated standard
reflected in the Convention. In installment contracts, the
complexity of the Code with its varying standards is likely to be
unattractive to the parties and their counsel. The Convention
provides
a
straightforward,
uncomplicated
standard:
fundamental breach for an instalment or the whole contract.
Both legal regimes authorize inspection by the buyer and
require notice of any non-conformity. The Code offer a more
flexible nebulous standard of “a reasonable time” when
compared with the staccato rhythms of examination imposed by
Article 38 followed by notice of any defect within a reasonable
time as dictated by the Convention. Any adverse impact of
Article 38, however, can be ameliorated by an agreement
between the parties defining the period for examination and/or
notice. The choice between the two regimes should be based on the
client’s assessment of its business model, its risk tolerance, the custom
and usages of its industry, and its contracting goals. A U.S. domestic
business, in an effort to establish new markets for its goods in developing
nations, might suggest the Convention as the governing law in order to
develop trust with parties who might otherwise fear being overreached,
yet, include in the agreement a choice of forum that facilitates resolution
of disputes through the use of discovery, procedural tools, and processes
with which the U.S. domestic party is familiar and fine tune the
Convention’s provisions by agreement. The Convention greatly increases
opportunities for parties to order their relationship to reflect their
business goals and objectives.

